Filed Under: Nuclear Issues, Nuclear Security Summit 2012, Publications, South Korea, U.S.-ROK relations, Working Papers

A 1986 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that a small number of groups may have been capable of high-level nuclear terrorism, if they had access to a weapon or sufficient fissile material, but were inhibited by the political consequences.

Access to fissile material is key—both for terrorists trying to attain a nuclear capability, and those racing to stop them. And global stocks of fissile material—highly enriched uranium and plutonium separated from spent fuel—are roughly 2,000 metric tons and growing. Moreover, this material is spread across dozens of sites, with hundreds of buildings, in 30 some countries, under varying security conditions. Consequently, the security of fissile material is not merely a theoretical concern.

In the latest installment of the USKI Working Paper Series on the Nuclear Security Summit process, William Tobey (Belfer Center, Harvard University) illustrates the very real threat of nuclear terrorism that looms today, which has been the impetus for the Nuclear Security Summit process, and suggests what measures the international community should be taking to ensure a higher standard of security for all nuclear material.

Download “Building a Better International Nuclear Security Standard,” by William Tobey.

For related papers, visit our Nuclear Security Summit page.