Trust Building and Cooperation in Korean-American Relations: Changing Contexts and Actors

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TRANSCRIPT

WELCOME & OVERVIEW

Sarah Snyder (National Bureau of Asian Research): Thank you very much for coming today for *Trust Building and Cooperation in Korean-American Relations: Changing Contexts and Actors*. We have a very unique team today, five of them have flown in from South Korea, and we have five American scholars who have been researching different issues within the U.S. context and the South Korean context that pertain, or influence, relationships between the two countries.

So trends, as you will see in your agenda, that look at issues such as security topics, economic and trade topics, Koreans in America, civil society politics, and really, looking to see how these things influence as they develop in South Korea, as they develop in the states; how do these trends influence the way bilateral relations are moving?

I'd like to give a special thank you to the Korea Foundation for helping to make this possible. This is the third of a three year project that will be resulting in a manuscript that all of the folks that are here today are creating, writing chapters, researching and writing chapters that will be combined into one manuscript. I would also like to give a special thanks to the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. Jae Ku, the President of this institute will be joining us later for a few remarks as well.

If I could ask Kathy Moon to come up, excuse me, next we have Dr. Geun Lee. He is with Seoul National University as well as with the Korea Institute for Future Strategies, which is the partner organization to the National Bureau of Asian Research and working on this series. If I could ask you to come up and make a few remarks as well.

Dr. Geun Lee (Korea Institute for Future Strategies): Thank you, Sarah. First of all, I'd like to express my gratitude for having us here at one of the most prestigious universities, particular foreign relations universities, here in the United States. SAIS is very well known in Korea, everyone wants to come here and study and I'm really happy to be here. Well, as introduced by Sarah, this is a three-year project, funded by the Korea Foundation, and we started this project to build the trust between Korea and the United States. And I thought perhaps that it would be good to have a new approach between Korea and the United States, by inviting relatively young and

unknown, but they are very well known in their own countries, but relatively young scholars specializing in various fields including domestic politics and ethnic politics both in the USA and South Korea. I thought perhaps that one of the problems, the distrust problem, between the U.S. and Korea, might be under-information or misinformation about politics of the society of each country. Therefore we tried to do research on our own societies, in South Korea and also the United States, in various aspects: economics, politics, security, civil society. And this is the final year for our project, the third year, and we have the tentative outcomes already. We are going to give you some of the findings that we have, and I think that the Korean-American scholars who are joining us for this project are very helpful and their research have been very, very fruitful. I think we've learned a lot from their contributions, and I hope this conference will give you as much information as possible on our two societies.

I would like to thank the Korea Foundation for funding this project and I would also like to thank NBR and the Korea Institute for Future Strategies, and also the School of Advanced International Studies. Thank you very much, and I would like to invite Professor Katharine.

Professor Katharine H.S. Moon (Wellesley College): If you are wondering why Professor Lee and I are speaking it is simply because we are the respective team leaders for our two sides across the Pacific, so that has been one of the most unique and exciting parts of doing this research project, that we had five Korean scholars from Korea and five American scholars from the United States, and it's literally been about bridge building intellectually and idea sharing. Also about rethinking assumptions that each side had, even us scholars. Each of us had our own ignorances, gaps in knowledge, biases, etc. and so we have gone through the very process ourselves as individuals that we hope readers of our book, we hope you as an audience, will

engage in. As you listen to our papers, try to empty yourselves of past ideas or prejudices, assumptions, and try to think anew and creatively and openly. And I wish this were a regular process in Washington D.C., and those of you who live here know this is not a regular process in Washington D.C, and I wish you to know another unique part of our project that I believe none of us as scholars and researchers came to the collected table with a fixed idea in mind. We, really, this has been an intellectual and policy adventure for us in a way, trying to explore how to go about thinking about issues about cooperation, distrust, together and to learn from one another and to be open minded, even if we disagree in certain areas.

And again this is another model we hope we can try to convey to people, if not through the air at least through words, that we really need to think about ways to free ourselves from having policy or research agendas that we start off with that we want to make sure we prove or confirm, rather than opening up new questions and letting those questions guide us to new answers.

My thanks, Korea Foundation has been thanked many times, I will skip that part and thank specific individuals. Ms. Tong Hi Sa from Korea who has kept the Korean team in good order, oh do you want to stand up? And Ms. Sarah Snyder of NBR, you've already met her, she introduced the project, but Sarah has also been instrumental, in every way to get this project onboard, on time, and move us along and guide us, so thanks to Sarah. I just want to reiterate Professor Lee's introductory remark that we really made it a point to bring to you new faces, faces that usually don't hang out in Washington D.C. I've been to so many of these seminars, where it's almost always the same faces every time, with the same questions, and in truth we don't make much progress in thinking if we don't bring new people, new ideas into the mix. So

we hope you will enjoy the new faces and the old faces, and we welcome your feedback during Q&A time.

What we have done, if you look at the agenda, we have given each speaker seven minutes and a three minute critique time. If it's confusing to you, I just want to explain that the critiques will occur after the next paper presenter has gone so that the paper presenter is not preempted by the critique. So you'll get it as we go along. Thank you.

TRUST, MISTRUST, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

Byoung Kwon Sohn (Chung-Ang University): Hello. Good afternoon and welcome to this presentation. I am Byoung Kwon Sohn, Professor in the Department of International Relations in Chung-Ang University, Korea. I'm moderating this first round of presentations and the title of this first round is "Trust, Mistrust, and Bilateral Relations" and we have two pairs. One pair composed of two presenters and presenter will present their paper within seven minutes and after that they will critique within three minutes the other's counterpart's paper.

First, I will introduce the panelists briefly in the order of presentation. Youngshik Bong is an Assistant Professor at American University's School of International Service in Washington D.C. His researching includes interplay between nationalism and globalization and security issues, including Dokdo and other island disputes in Asia, and anti-Americanism, and U.S.-Korea alliance. And next to, right to him is Joon-Hyung Kim. He is an Associate Professor of International Studies at Handong Global University and his research interests covers international relations in general, U.S.-Korea relations, and inter-Korea relationship. To his right is Seonjou Kang, he is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, which is briefly called IFANS in Korea, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Korea, and their major research interests includes international finance and trade, global governments, and international development and cooperation. And finally we have Abraham Kim, who is currently Vice President at the Korean Economic Institute, and before joining this institute he was working formerly for Eurasia Group and his research includes such issues as international trade, political stability in emerging markets, and the political implication of the financial crises, and the global pandemic crisis.

The time is pretty tight, so I would really like all of the panelists to be punctual.

Youngshik Bong (American University): Can you hear me back there? Can you hear me? Am I in a Verizon commercial, can you hear me? That's why I'm using iPhone. Can you hear me now?

Ok, thank you very much. I'm especially thankful for Jae Ku for hosting this event. My dear friend did not disappoint me this time either. It was a year before I joined American University, three years ago, that J.J Suh, Professor at the SAIS Korean politics came down to this and we have been engaging in numerous collaborative projects increasing public education and awareness of Korea-U.S. relations, so I would like to invite all you to future events hosted by SAIS and American University.

I'd like to begin my presentation by citing J.J. Suh's dissertation. It seems like 60 years ago, but I still remember the first line of his dissertation on the persistency of U.S.-South Korea military alliance. He wrote, "What happens after states make commitment?" It's very serious and heavy and is still engrained in my memory. I think that line nicely captures the essence of international security, and is a useful line to think of with the issue of trust building between security partners like the United States and South Korea.

What happens after states make commitment? I think there is a great deal of similarity between interpersonal relationship and interstate relationships, and it comes down to trust. Think about, when you are asked by somebody, "Do you trust me?" What would be your first reaction? "Why do you ask?" right? You feel uncomfortable and anxious, and I guess there's a similar reaction would be engendered between states, even the closest security partners if the whole question in

primarily framed as a matter of existence and a matter of mutual trust. The whole purpose of this project, as I understood it, is to be provocative and original, with interesting ideas by bilateral partnership between U.S. and South Korea, so let me be provocative.

So, I argue that all these talks of trust as a foundation of security alliance between U.S. and South Korea has been overrated. I argue that the major cooperation between South Korea and the United States has not been mutual trust, but abundant mutual interest. So let me repeat, the mutual interest, rather than the mutual trust are the primary preconditions for the bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and we have to welcome this as a positive development, not a liability. So many of the trust problems either rated in the history of security cooperation between the country, stem from the confusion between mutual interest, mutual trust.

Since mutual interest has always been abundant in the bilateral relationship between South Korea and the U.S, both sides have the tendency to identify mutual interest as mutual trust. In my paper, I highlight a few policy implications based upon this argument. First, trust building begins from domestic politics. If South Korea wants to discuss bilateral relations with the U.S., or vice versa, then ensuring public trust for leadership should come first, because any security partner will not put utmost trust if its partner does not command enough trust at home. It's a deliverability problem. Whatever will be studied at the summit meeting, if it's not going to be fulfilled at home, then there's no way, there's no strong incentive for the partner to make big gesture, based upon trust. Related to this point, personal chemistry and friendship between leaders only compliment wise diplomacy based upon some principle of mutual interest, but summit meetings based upon good chemistry between top leaders only go so far. You cannot substitute diplomacy based upon

principle and mutual interest. So in hindsight, the bilateral secure cooperation between U.S. and South Korea has not only survived, but prospered and thrived. Even in the absence of mutual trust during the Cold War and beyond, think about its survival during the Bush era with the Moo-hyun government at its point.

Some people would suggest that the rising of the anti-American sentiment as a side effect of democratic consultation in South Korea will be the destabilizing cause for future secure partnership, but I think the negative effect of anti-American sentiment has been exaggerated because South Korea's perception of the United States is never monolithic, or fixed, but it fluctuates with conditions in domestic politics as well as the U.S. posture in global politics.

Second observation is that it is very dangerous for South Korea to try to emphasize the Japan question as a possible bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States in the security cooperation. It is equally dangerous or counterproductive for the United States to turn a blind eye to the South Korea sensitivity to its own history.

My third observation, which is my last point, is that Seoul and Washington have an uphill battle with the diminishing public trust in government's own security discourse and policy. American public has been tired and disappointed of the prolonged two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, let alone the disappointing discovery of intelligence failures. The sudden dismissal of General Stanley McChrystal is a case in point. And likewise the South Korean people demonstrated their deep-seated suspicion of government-imposed security reality in the last local election. Rather than punishing North Korea for the Cheonan incident, they voted in a way to demonstrate their deep-seated suspicion of the veracity of the government sponsored investigation report. So both

leaderships have to exert far more effort to persuade their own respective publics, if they want to place their foundation of renewed and upgraded security partnership on renewed grounds.

So, in conclusion, what is needed is modest proposition for trust building in bilateral security relations. That is, both countries need to experience small successes while restraining hope for major scores, like homeruns in baseball games, to help build cooperation and trust. The top surrounding U.S. bilateral security relations has been predominantly framed in existence or absence of mutual trust, and I argue that such binary framing tends to dismiss what both allies practically basically achieve based upon mutual interest. Mutual trust may very well be the ultimate ingredient of the bilateral security alliance at its highest stage, but trust building cannot begin without pursuing mutual interest first. Thank you.

Joon-Hyung Kim (Handong Global University): Thank you very much. My title of the paper is a little provocative too. The title of my paper is "South Korean Foreign Policy Dependence: Especially on the Case of North Korean Policy." Actually our overarching theme is like a building of mutual trust. So actually, Dr. Bong, my area was actually security area, as you know, isn't actually the building of mutual trust is the least valued. So it's hard for us to emphasize the value of mutual trust because even though we are facing that, mutual trust is not that big of a deal so far. So he and I are both skeptical, actually, of the highly claimed efficiency of the highly claimed mutual trust by the leadership of both countries. Actually, about the term "mutual trust", he raised the issue of "trust" in his article, and I raised the problem with the word "mutual".

Actually, I emphasized three points in my article. Number one is I tried to explain the reasons for the persistence of South Korea's foreign policy dependence on the U.S. after reviewing historical

trends and the pattern of Korea's dependence on the U.S. and its tentative cause of path among variables unexplored. Why, my main question is, why South Korea's foreign policy dependence on the U.S. not only existed in the Cold War times, but also remained after the event of post-Cold War, despite much reduced security threats? What are the new variables that sustain this symmetric ROK-U.S. alliance?

Second, I raise the issue, mutual trust in this context of unequal relationships. To study them deals with the agenda of trust building as a future reason of strategic alliance, which has been raised frequently, recently, within the context of these continuing unequal relations. The efforts to promote Korea's foreign policy autonomy by the two oppressive administrations, as we know, were serious enough, to alarm the conservatives in both countries and made the Korean people realize the desirability of more equality in the alliance. But, I don't think, they were not enough to transform the old unequal relations between any genuine terms. Rather, the policy confusing between returning to the old cohesive blood ties ROK-U.S. alliance and enhancing autonomy led to political inconsistencies, and continuing political under the illogical struggles within Korea during Moo-hyun and Bush administrations.

Regarding the issue of the strategic alliance based on the common values they're talking about, it seems they logically write a path for the alliance to pursue, after more than 50 years of military-based alliance. But there are critical problems in reality. Among them two stand out, first of all, the U.S.-ROK alliance still relies too much on the military, despite more frequent rhetorical expression of values recently. Especially two unfolding developments defy the future event of the post-Cold War in the Korean peninsula. One is the 9/11 terrorist attack and the other is North

Korea's nuclear program. And maybe that rising China issue and rising new kinds of nationalism in the Northeast station.

Secondly, the alliance is still too asymmetrical. Genuine democratic trust cannot be built on this kind of continuing unequal relationship. Unequal alliance is generally characterized by mutual mistrust and by trust. Since their foreign policy perspective as well as priority is different. The two liberal regimes in Korea indeed tried to transform this typical U.S.-ROK relation to acquire more symmetry and independence. However these attempts confronted tremendous oppositions, not only from inside Korea, but from its senior partner. It was perceived as a potential sign of South Korea's detachment in the alliance, and was negatively interpreted by the Bush administration.

And thirdly, I suggested three alternatives, or options, for a more equitable alliance, based on trust and values, not just on military imperatives. Number one, South Korea could exercise a relatively higher degree of autonomy, when it acknowledged North Korea as a main actor in the region. Number two, is focusing more on the transforming of the U.S. hegemonic structure in the region into multilateral formations. Number three, the last key to announce Korea's autonomy, depends on whether or not the vicious cycle of institutionalized inertia, which has already gained a certain reproduction, can be stopped. For decades the friendship between the U.S. and South Korea has been taken for granted or considered automatic. Since the Bush and Roh's administration, it became clear that it had to be earned with a serious effort. Therefore, at the present, democratic trust may be more vital than ever during the U.S.-ROK relationship. However, without a considerate effort by the leadership and the public in both countries to

fashion the alliance, the fissures in the alliance will come back in the near future. It may be or may not be; we have to wait longer to find the real direction.

It is true that the two previous liberal regimes in Korea indeed brought the U.S. alliance, the U.S.-ROK alliance, to the lowest point in its history; however, it was a rather necessary suffering for hammering out a better and more equitable relationship. If we truly believe that more equitable relations is more beneficial for both countries. Many people say the U.S.-ROK relations these days has never been better, especially after we suffered in regimes before, but what about equity enhancement? I know, but compared with Bush administrations, Obama is very careful and even considerate when he deals with South Korea. Is this his style or mood, or is it really substance there? Still so, good, but I don't think the real test has come yet between the two countries. They agree with the big theme, or the overarching theme, but FTA and other things, like joining the MD or OPCON, will face serious oppositions in Korea too. Still, we'll just have to wait. That's my point, and that's where I'll close. Thank you very much.

Sohn: Thank you both for very condensed presentation. It's time now for a three-minute critique, Dr. Bong first.

Bong: Well the easiest response to the request is that I totally agree with what he said in his paper, but I do have some points. If you have a chance to read his excellent paper on South Korea's dilemma between the fear of entrapment by the United States or the fear of abandonment, then you will realize how rich his theoretical discussion of the issue really is. But on the downside, his choice of multiple theoretical variables undercuts the value of his approach in the case of enhancing the units of applicability, putting the whole question of reformulation of

U.S.-Korea military alliance in the general theoretical discussions in international security. That's the first point of my critical review of his paper. My second point is that everybody would agree that transformation, if not upgrading, of U.S.-Korea bilateral security alliance is a good thing, but our focus is not so much about the normative justification of the change or the demand for the change but the question of how, at what cost, in what terms both partners will supply it. So his paper can even extend a wonderful and penetrating analysis of the bilateral security partnership into the question of supply of the transformation.

J. Kim: Thank you very much for kind comments. Actually, it's the same here to his article, and actually I mentioned about the common dilemma that we struggle to have in the foreign policy area and talking about mutual trust. Actually, his main thesis is mutual interest is more important than mutual trust especially in the foreign policy area. I totally agree with that because confusion causes over-expectations, and over-expectations generates misunderstanding and that causes a lot of mistrust or distrust between the country over the past years. And we have the same problem here, collecting issues because Dr. Bong and I discussed the value of trust and the word "mutual," then what's the point for trust to be pursued? And the second part, we need to try more things to persuade, why here can mutual trust be a premium or be part of this interest-based relationship? And his empirical cases are excellent, still the same point here, is it really those good relations? The case of cooperation can be representative and be a good milestone that can be followed in the future. Is it really, as I talked about, is it a real test, or can it be a representative case for the cooperation we have to look for?

Sohn: At this stage there is no mutual lateral between the presenters and they may do when they answer the questions raised by you during the Q&A session in a short while, and as a moderator

I have one comment. I don't know how the audience feels about the presentations, but to me what really matters related to the U.S.-Korea relationship is that not necessarily only trust, but also the interest, as Dr. Bong emphasized and as a traditional realist argues. The other thing is that what matters is that any trust, system inertia or social identity, as Dr. Kim raised.

The time is pretty tight so we will rightly move over to economic trade issue between Korea and U.S. and will listen to presentation by Dr. Kang.

Seonjou Kang (IFANS): Thank you for having me here. The title of my research is, "The Economic Origins of Distrust between Korea and the United States." My studies focus on the economic causes, how economic issues affected the trust and mistrust between the United States and Korea. As the beginning of my research, I defined trust first. I defined trust as the belief that the other states prefer mutual cooperation to exploiting each other. Then in relation to this definition of trust, I defined what cooperation means. Cooperation means abiding by the issues between two countries. So applying this concept of trust to international economic relations, trust means the countries abiding by argument by economic issues, particularly free trade.

Free trade is particularly important for multilateral and bilateral relations because anarchy conditions, general anarchy conditions of international relations. Free trade is good economic sense, but very difficult in political sense. Every country has the incentive to exploit other country's free trade while they practice protectionism, so the trust between two countries over in economic issues means they abide by agreements on the free trade. So that is the definition of trust in U.S.-Korea economic relations.

Anarchy conditions make it difficult for countries to abide by augments on free trade, but at the same time abiding by the augments on free trade is highly affected by domestic politics. That is so because the sector, the citizens employed in the sector that have lost competitiveness or likely to lose competitiveness in the world market, they ask the government to take protective measures. So, that's why the anarchy conditions provide general difficulties for countries to stick with in free trade, but domestic politics add more difficulties for countries to practice free trade.

So, the bilateral economic relations between the United States and Korea, over the ten years, from 1995, these two countries had trade disputes over rice, automobiles, tin, pharmaceutical, and intellectual property rights, and other stuff. And also in the subsidized high nix-electronic companies, something like that. Most of these issues were initiated by the United States, and Korea was largely defensive responding to these disputes. And the reason why the United States initiated many of these trade disputes with Korea was the United States had a chronic trade deficit with Korea, that's the first reason. The second reason was that the United States was going through structural changes in its economy. The structural change the United States was undergoing, the manufacturing sector was waning. But only some selective sectors like knowledge intensive pharmaceuticals and financial services. Those sectors had gained competitiveness in the world market. So, the United States in an attempt to open Korean markets for its competitive goods, the United States initiated trade disputes and pressured the Korean government to open its market. Because Korea heavily depended on the United States, Korea responded to the claims by practicing protectionism, but nonetheless Korea showed some resentment against United States, because the United States had a much bigger economy and was

a much richer country then Korea. Many Koreans were just believing the strong United States was bullying weak Korea.

To a certain degree, the trade disputes or accusations made by the United States has some valid points but the trade dispute started anti-American sentiment in Korea, and because of the democratic political process and strong nationalism, these two factors made things more complicated in Korea. These days these two countries are looking for a more institutionalized mechanism to deal with their bilateral trade. The so-called KORUS, Korea-U.S. free trade agreement. This free trade agreement is expected to reduce trade disputes between these two countries because this agreement covers a broad range of goods between the two countries and it also has better legal procedures to deal with trade deficit so these two countries wouldn't have to go to the World Trade Organization to settle their trade disputes. But there is too much raised about this agreement. Still this agreement has to be ratified in both countries, and even after ratification they, particularly Korea, have to go through introducing more reform and more implementation laws. These requirements will politicize the free trade agreement once again. Nobody knows what effects, what economic benefits this economic agreement will bring to Korea. So the mistrust[ing] perception of the United States about this free trade agreement depend on the performance of the free trade agreement.

So the United States and Korea try to address the mistrust between them with the free trade agreement but it still remains to be seen how well this free trade agreement will address their problems and take their relations to the next level. Thank you.

Sohn: Thank you, Dr. Kim.

Abraham Kim (Korea Economic Institute): Thank you very much. I'm timing myself so I'll go over. I feel like I'm coming back home, because in the early '90s, my wife was actually an alumni of SAIS, and I lived right here on Massachusetts Avenue. I spent many days, many weeks and months here at SAIS so it's really great to be back.

I think Dr. Kang's paper and my paper, how it gels together is, she kind of covers U.S. trade history and stops at KORUS FTA, and I pick up at KORUS FTA and I look forward. So the unique challenge in my paper is that I can't finish my paper 'til the end of the year, and you'll understand as I explain to you what my paper is about. The title of my paper is, "KORUS FTA Puzzle." I think we'll all agree that U.S.-South Korea relations have not been more stronger than ever at this current point. I think of in terms of if you look back on some of the events of the past couple of years, relations have been very stronger in the Lee Myung-bak administration. Take a look at the Visa Waiver Program, South Korea being inducted into the foreign military sales, aka NATO+3 now, the U.S. cooperation with Korea over the Cheonan incident, the G20, and the nuclear summit.

Now the big puzzle here is that if the relations are great, then why can't we get the FTA passed? What the FTA actually highlights is the limits of the idea of that just bilateral trust and cooperation between two unitary countries is actually probably an insufficient analytical lens to look at the two countries. And of course we all know what is the trouble with getting the FTA passed, it's, one of the main reasons, U.S. domestic politics. But that is sort of an easy answer to the troubles, so as a political scientist I was scratching my head trying to figure out, how can we parse and analytically study it so that, at least for the academic community and the policy community, we can understand the dynamics and how we can get the FTA passed, what are the

things we need to look out for. And not to bore you with too many international relations theories and so forth, but basically in my paper I integrate the notion of two-level game theory, which probably most of you are familiar with. I used Helen Milner's work and the notion of veto players. And basically in a nutshell, two-level game, when international cooperators negotiate cooperation they always have to look behind their shoulders to see whether their domestic players will accept the agreement once they make it, right? And the notion of veto players is that it's not just one individual actor behind you to prove this, but there may be multiple players here, multiple stakeholders that need to proof before an agreement to be ultimately ratified. And so as you can see, we can conceptualize how FTA and the ratification process this way, two-level game with multiple veto players that need to ratify the FTA.

Now the question is who are the veto players? We all know it's the Democratic majority that holds the Congress and their key leaderships that are somewhat reticent about supporting the FTA, of course there are some names you probably know, some names you don't, but there's Congressmen Sander Levin, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee; Louise Slaughter, Rules Committee; Nancy Pelosi who's somewhat reticent; and the like. So, these key leadership folks block the process 'cause Congress is so procedural. So, in order for FTA to ultimately be ratified these veto players either need to be supported or their minds changed or voted out of office. But to this point, the economy in general, in the last two years, has been very supportive of the anti-FTA group because with the troubled economy there's been this enforced idea somehow, rhetoric, trade equals lost jobs, right, the whole notion that if we open up our markets all our jobs will go overseas. Rather than the general notion that trade equals exports equals more

jobs, which is the traditional notion, but also the high deficit as well. The economy being down means everyone is also susceptible to the deficit.

But thirdly, what has also created problems is the lack of leadership on the trade agenda. President Obama has not defined what the trade agenda is and has not gotten behind it, and of course that's changed this last weekend, and of course I'll get to that, but trade has been the second-tier priority to the administration at this point and we know why, because of healthcare reform, social regulatory reform, climate change energy reform, Supreme Court justices, Afghanistan, Iraq, a whole list of priorities.

Now I've told you why we haven't been able to change the status quo and why these veto players have been fairly entrenched. So going back to the notion of veto player, how do you change veto players? In my paper I list out three basic ideas. One, of course, is you increase the benefits of the agreement, and if you read the literature it's these things called side payments, you support this, we'll give you favors, and whatnot so you increase the benefit of supporting the agreement. The other is raising the cost of disagreeing, you threaten them, you pressure them, or whatnot to change their decision, and three as I mentioned you change the leadership, vote them out of office. And coming back to this weekend, I'm sure all of you know the announcement in the G20, President Obama said to Ron Kirk and his Korean counterparts, that I'm going to try to get an agreement by November by the next G20 meeting. This is kind of a very critical moment, and it signals that finally President Obama is taking leadership. Whether he will follow through is another question, at least he's put a date and at least he's stepped forward and said the administration is going to do something about it. And also he's tried to change the discourse on trade, and since the State of the Union address this whole "trade doesn't mean you're going to

lose your jobs, trade actually means more jobs." So he's trying to change the discourse, and we're going to have to look ahead is how President Obama going to bargain. Either raise the agreement supporting this agreement, or raising the cost of disapproving the agreement disapproving it with these key veto players. How will we deal with Nancy Pelosi, Michael Michaud, Sander Levin, all these folks who are key people that can block the FTA. But again the question is whether he will follow through, because again all of those priorities I mentioned before, climate change, Afghanistan, BP, all these things, they have not gone away. Whether he will be able to deliver in November is something we shall have to watch out for, and I'll be continuously watching, and I'll hopefully finish my paper then.

But also what's important, my third point, changing these veto players, we all know the upcoming midterm election in November. The general wisdom is that the Republicans will take some seats back, not necessarily a majority but they will take some seats back. And how that will change the dynamics and attitudes toward trade and whether some of these veto players will be voted out of office will be an open question but in any case those are some of the things we have to watch out for. Overall it's a positive momentum, we're only week since the announcement and there's already been a lot of movement on the Hill as well in the USTR, but it looks like there maybe some positive change, and hopefully the analytical approach to watch these veto players will be an effective way to see things are changing subtly. That's it thanks.

Sohn: Now for three minute comments. You, first.

S. Kang: Actually I had originally had two comments, but Dr. Kim already addressed one of them, how the coming elections will change the dynamics in Congress, and how the new

dynamics will affect the ratification of the KORUS FTA. So, only we will see after this November. So, it is everybody's guess right now. The actual comment I would like to make, President Obama ran his campaign on the concept free trade, I mean, fair trade, not free trade. Now he says trade means exports and jobs, then I think this new discourse is only valued only if trade is fair. So I just wonder how the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement fits the concept or the notion of fair trade that President Obama emphasized. So by assessing the fairness of Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, if it is not deemed to be so fair, then I think Dr. Kim should give us some policy recommendations, how to make KORUS FTA look fair. So to make it easier to pass U.S. Congress. So that is my comment to you.

A. Kim: Boy, if I could give that recommendation, I'd be the next USTR, right, so I'm just going to make a couple of quick comments. I think Dr. Kang, one of the issues she does point out is this notion of, actually we both covered it, is this interaction between trade agreement and domestic politics, and one of the concerns she highlights in her paper, which is correct, which is expectation building for the KORUS FTA. And Ambassador Han is going to various cities making a speech as well where the notion of KORUS FTA will increase exports, where South Korea will benefit in the long run, but the U.S. will benefit immediately, as in the short run, which will equal more jobs. And President Obama, of course, is saying that too, so there's this built-in expectation that once we pass this, the economy is going to improve. Which in some ways is a risky strategy, because what if it doesn't immediately? What if KORUS FTA, there are problems and the U.S. continues to have high unemployment, which is right now at 10%, and if U.S. growth continues to stagnate and we get this KORUS FTA passed and nothing really

improves, then that actually could fuel mistrust and opposition. So, I think that's an interesting insight she points out.

And in general, just the overall paper talks about mistrust and so forth, but in fact the development of, well, actually, South Korea-U.S. trade relationships have been tense, and there have been a lot of issues of conflict, but the important thing to remember is that U.S.-Korea relationship trade is actually institutional, so a lot of the conflicts are happening with the institution and are not becoming politicized. And the notion that we are actually talking about FTA, is a signal that this relationship has reached a high level of trust, despite those conflicts, and in fact we're going into an area where we're going to further institutionalize the relationship. So there have been a lot of conflicts, but it's been a good conflict. It's like marriage, you fight, but your fight is institutionalized in a marriage, so you're not going to go forward and strike this through your marriage right in the end. Well that's the hope, but anyways the whole notion is that we are talking about FTA and FTA passing, the whole relationship is heading the right direction.

Sohn: You know my one comment is, Dr. Abraham Kim, when mentioning veto players; he tried to emphasize what was the hard part on American side in passing, the KORUS Free Trade Agreement. I don't know who would be the right person, but if you know someone, write down the reason why it was also hard on the Korean side to pass the Free Trade agreement and to ratify it would be a good match for the other.

Okay, that's all for the presentation and it's time for Q&A session for the audience. If anybody has questions, why don't you move forward. Okay, thank you. That gentleman first.

Guest 1 (Chul Chung, Korea International Trade Association): Thank you, I'm Chul Chung from Korea International Trade Association, sorry I missed the most part of Dr. Kang's presentation, yet I did catch the latter part. Seems like you mentioned, that no one knows what the KORUS FTA is going to bring, but as an economist, actually, many seem to know what the KORUS FTA will bring. To me that's a no-brainer economically, but the reason why it's been stalled for three years may be because of these domestic politics. Having said that, my question is actually what kind of challenges are going to be ahead for both Korea and America domestic politics before November? And it seems already in the U.S. on the Hill it's actually rattling a lot, and many of the position letters are actually drafted, and many supporting letters have been published as well. So I'd like to know if any suggestions for the policymakers or the people in the field on how to approach this and what kind of risks are taken into account, and one other comment. Dr. Kim's point, what if the KORUS FTA has actually been implemented, ratified, and what if there's not much of an economic gain, but when we think about this I think we should actually think about it in a counterfactual way, but for analysis. What if there is no KORUS FTA and how the economy has been doing versus with the KORUS FTA how the economy is? Okay here.

Sohn: After taking a question from the gentleman….

Guest 2 (Marco Sylvester, University of Oxford): Hello, my name is Marco Sylvester; I'm here with the Oxford group. My question is for Dr. Kim and Dr. Kang, from the news I have read, if I'm correct, there's been a great deal between South Korea and the European Union a few months ago, around ten billion actually, decreasing the tariff quotas between mutual trade. Could you please elaborate on this topic, does it mean there's a bigger trust between Korea and European Union compared to the trust between Korea and United States, and in my opinion,

European has always been a bigger protectionist institution then the United States. If you could please elaborate on this? Thank you.

Sohn: Okay, two questions for two panelists on Free Trade Agreement. Now, anybody has questions on security issues, okay?

Guest 3 (Youngji Cho, SAIS): Hi, my name is Youngji Cho at SAIS; I have a question to Professor Bong and Professor Kim. That, in my understanding, the difference between trust and mutual interest is that mutual trust requires more time to have, whereas mutual interest can be formed more easily, typically, when there are incentives between two countries. In this regard I think mutual trust can be sustained or increased, it could be a good foundation for strong trust building. So I wonder what kind of factors can sustain or increase?

Sohn: Ok that gentleman here.

Guest 4 (Daniel Yoon, CSIS Korea Chair): Hi, my name is Dan Yoon and I'm representing CSIS Korea Chair. My question is to Dr. Kim. You mentioned an equitable relationship between United States and Republic of Korea as something to be desired, as if, right now at the moment, there is resentment to the imbalance or asymmetry between the two countries. Is equity to be desired in upon itself, if the Korea and United States are really equal partners in the international community, in the region in terms of contributing security concerns and so on and so forth?

Sohn: I will give each panelist two minutes to answer. So, why don't we start first this time with Abraham Kim?

A. Kim (KEI): A lot of good questions, tough questions. I think in regards to what lays ahead, one is how the ultimate agreement is going to come out, and to avoid the whole word "renegotiation," because certainly, trying to deal with the auto and beef part of the agreement, and without making it look like a renegotiation, would be the point of the challenge, of course. I guess whether a side letter, like the letter agreement, would be appropriate or not, it would be politically palatable by the Koreas, would be an open question. And whether President Lee will be able to turn around and sell that domestically will be a challenge as well.

Secondly, we're going to have to watch how much political capital President Obama is willing to put to this, because he made a pretty dramatic statement after the G20 and putting a deadline. Whether he's going to, actually, as you mentioned, there's already political rumbling on the Hill and as we've read the reports, he's notified Congressional Hill 30 minutes before his announcement, and then he made the announcement and there was some pretty, Sander Levin came out with some remarks, and I guess Michael Michaud is circulating a dear colleague letter, or something, and the like. So, there's already opposition rumbling, and so the question is that indicated my presentation is that it's something we'll have to watch. We have seen Obama say in the past, "KORUS FTA, we need to get this passed," but this is actually the first time he's set a date. And so whether he'll do that and how he'll do that, given all of the other stuff he has to do, because KORUS FTA is only one of the many priorities he already has. And, as I mentioned, it's questionable whether trade will become a first priority or not, given financial regulatory reform, energy reform, if one of the other Supreme Court Justices decides to retire and whatnot.

For that, secondly, I guess I didn't fully understand your counterfactual question, but what if KORUS FTA doesn't happen, we will continue to do the 86 billion dollars a year trade, but that

has been the argument on the opposed views, why do we have to do it now, can we do it later. And, I guess what the Koreans are saying, "Well we're going to get the easy EU and Canadian FTA done and that'll be a cost to the U.S." And that's the on point discourse that's going on right now. Whether that's true or not is left to be seen. Which leads me to the EU question, whether the EU is a more trustworthy partner then the U.S. . . .

Kang: The effect of the KORUS FTA, I just want to say this, the assumptions about the KORUS FTA have changed after the financial crisis. That's the first and foremost reasons that we can expect anything. I mean, we cannot be sure about the effects of the KORUS FTA in the same way of the Korea-EU FTA. The whole understanding surrounding these two has changed dramatically after the financial crisis, and then what lies ahead, the ratification. As much as the domestic political dynamics is going to change in the United States, domestic political dynamics have already changed in Korea's June election. The opposition party has gained some momentum against the Lee Myung-bak government. So, that will affect the perspective for the ratification of KORUS FTA. And why the Korea-EU FTA didn't get much attention, looks more trustworthy. Koreans are much more sensitive about the United States, and while the Korea-EU FTA was negotiated, there was almost no protest against that FTA. That tells how sensitive Koreans are about the United States. The Korea sensitivity toward the United States has many factors: the alliance, history, social, and economic issues. So, everything goes into the Korea-U.S. relations, so that's why if this FTA doesn't get ratified that will raise more mistrust between two countries. So…

Sohn: Ok, thank you. Only two minutes.

Bong: Why are you so strict about me? Do I look to have resentment? No, actually. We are not equally, strictly talking about hierarchical, I mean anarchical, especially international politics. We are juniors, South Korea is a junior, province definitely. The problem, the point I make here, is we have a more unequal debt than we deserve, the South Koreans deserve. Like all times in Cold War, we totally depend upon our security to the U.S., which is fine, but North Korea's threats are much reduced. Even though there's no zero-possibility of North Korean attack, I think it's the point that we have to have. And one more point is, U.S. and Korean leadership start to talk about the values, not the military alliance or protection. They talk about the mutual trust based on the values, now we have to talk about a more equal relationship. That's my point.

J. Kim: In response to Youngji's very difficult question about interest and trust for alliance persistency, I strongly recommend you read J.J. Suh's excellent book. That's definitely the point. The point is that sustaining alliance does not require one element, but multiple elements, and in that regard that taking care of original requirement for short-term survival and security, the value and merits based upon diplomacy of mutual interest should not be regarded as an inferior substitute for security partnership for mutual trust. So, I don't disagree that security partnership based upon mutual trust should be considered as an ultimate destination, but it shouldn't be used as a reason to discount security partnerships based upon interest. And, just like any other social institution, military alliance is over determined. Its existence is contingent upon not just one single factor, but multiple factors. Like KORUS pining away while the other couple who spend same amount of years in the White House stayed together. So maybe social institutions can sustain based upon mutual interest without mutual trust. Even thinking of my own marriage as a social institution similar to a military alliance between U.S. and Korea, it constantly reminds me

of what Tina Fey once commented on Jennifer Aniston and Brad Pitt parting. And she said that, "If these two people got tired of having sex with each other, what hope is there for the rest of us?" I'm not Brad Pitt and my wife is not either Jennifer Aniston or Angelina Jolie but we stay together as a couple and I will call that a success based upon whatever.

Sohn: Thank you, all panelists, for answering the questions, and thank you, audience, for raising the questions. Thank you.

DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF TRUST BUILDING AND COOPERATION

Dr. Geun Lee (Korea Institute for Future Strategies): Within, against, the backdrop we invited the leading scholars on these issues. We have an honor of having three Korean-American professors within the United States; they are leading scholars in their respective fields.

We have Professor Taeku Lee from the University of California, Berkeley. He's a specialist in ethnic politics in the United States. And we have also invited Professor Thomas Kim. He's the Executive Director of the Korea Policy Institute as well as a professor at Scripps University. And we have Dr. Yoonhee Kang. She is at Kookmin University and she's specializing in Russian Politics and Civil Society. We also have Professor Katharine Moon and she's a professor at Wellesley College and she's a very well known researcher on Korean-American relations and domestic politics in the United States. The backgrounds and descriptions are already well written on the biography that has been handed out to you, so I'm not going to go into the details of their backgrounds.

We are going to move right onto the presenters. The format is the same. I'm going to give you seven minutes for presentation and then we will have dialogue, or critique, of three minutes. I will start with Professor Taeku Lee.

Taeku Lee (University of California, Berkeley): Thank you. First, I should start by saying asking an academic to talk like this in seven minutes is like asking someone in the Beltway to give a 30 second sound bite in five seconds. So this will have the effect for you of a slideshow, snapshots from the research that I have done for this project, but I have many times at this speed. So it'll also be like a slideshow of summer vacation, keep in mind though, most summer

vacations are a disappointment. So I'm going to start with the disappointment here, and the disappointment here is that there are a lot of misconceptions about the Korean population in the United States. Which would leave you to believe that Korean-Americans as a part of this process of trust building should result in a fairly obvious reservable outcome, and that is a highly engaged, a highly politicized Korean-American community around issues that relate to trust building. In fact, what you see is quite the opposite. So, there are at least three kinds of misconceptions, I think, about Koreans in the United States that my paper tries to touch on.

One is this perception, perhaps from the Korean perspective, that the presumption that there is a population in the United States 1.3 to 1.5 million strong that is from Korea and therefore has presumptive primordial identity that is Korean, and therefore, will organize politically around Korean interests. There is no real empirical basis for that, as I look at some of the data I looked at for this paper. Another kind of misconception, more from a U.S. perspective, related to the myths about what happens to immigrants when they come to the United States, is that as a highly resource-based group, Korean-Americans will assimilate very seamlessly in American economical and social political life, based upon what scholars like to call the model minority myth; you should also see a highly engaged political community around issues of concern to Korean-Americans. There's also very little empirical support of that. And finally, from an academic, political science, perspective there's also a group that is quite high in socioeconomic standing should be quite politically engaged, and again there is no, very little, evidence for that. So, a few snapshots from the slideshow of a disappointing summer.

In terms of the demographic lay of the land, we are all aware that the racial and ethnic demographic landscape of this country has changed profoundly since the mid-1960s. Asian

Americans are a very important part of that transformation. What is important to note, with a respect to Korean-Americans, is that the general contours have changed. Which is this explosion of Americans of Asian and Latin American origin is not a pattern of explosive growth that has continued for Koreans in the United States. So there are two decades of significant immigration of immigrants from Korea to the United States and those were in the 1970s and 1980s. What I think better describes immigration from Korea to the United States now is imperial growth.

Secondly, in terms of socioeconomic standing, I think that the best way to describe the status of Koreans in the United States is not one of a model minority that has achieved as a group, remarkable socioeconomic outcomes. I think a better representation is that there are moderate levels of socioeconomic achievement by comparison to national means, and a significant discernable gap between the human capital of Korean-Americans and their socioeconomic outcomes. What I mean by that is things like the following, and again these are just snapshots. More than 50% of the Korean population in the United States is college educated or better, that's compared to 27% of the national average. And it is true that household income for Korean-Americans is higher than it is for the general population of the United States, but it's only barely higher. So it's only $54,000 per year, I think this is 2008 American Community Survey data, compared to the $52,000 for the national median household income. And it is a lot lower than the median household income for Asian-Americans as a group, which in 2008 was $69,000.

So, a third snapshot here is Korean-Americans are one of the few Asian-American groups where the overall levels of unemployment and the percentage of the persons who are below the poverty rate is higher than it is for the U.S. general population. So, again I think the characteristic is moderate success socioeconomically, but a gap between human capital, which is measured with

things like college education and actual socioeconomic outcomes. Then, the core of what I focus on is political engagement, political standing. And here I think the main picture is one of underrepresentation and under-participation. I look at multiple editions of participation, electoral, non-electoral, civic engagement, transnational activism, and across every measure Korean-Americans are less likely to participate then other reference groups. So as Asian-Americans as a group, roughly one out of three in the population older than eighteen vote, and that percentage is slightly lower for Korean-Americans, not hugely so, but it is lower. In other terms of more electoral participation, campaigning or contributing money to a candidate or a party, Korean-Americans are slightly lower than the participation of Asian-Americans as a whole. In terms of participation beyond the elections, like contacting elected officials, engaging in protest politics, it is also lower. Lower with civic engagement, lower for transnational activism. I should say here as a point of passing that one of the measures of transnational activism that people pay attention to is remittances, taking money back to your home country. And here I should note that, Korean-Americans, compared to other Asian-American groups, look to be extremely stingy. So while Korean-Americans are just as likely as any other Asian-American group to report being in regular contact with family and friends, that's about 80%, they are only half as likely to engage in remittances. So roughly one out of six Korean-Americans, in the survey that I use, report sending remittances back to Korea as opposed to one out of three for all the other Asian-American groups.

The one exception here in terms of engagement is religious engagement, so while 60% of Korean-Americans report regular church attendance, that's twice as high as it is for other Asian

groups in regular religious participation. And Korean-Americans are also more likely to engage in nonreligious activities through their church than other Asian groups in the U.S.

The overall picture here is one of pattern and paradox depending on what you choose to look at. It's also a picture of pessimism or promise depending what you choose to look at. And that's where I'll end, by showing one key reason I think for pessimism and a few potential sources for promise in terms of the possibility for Koreans to engage in the American community.

In terms of pessimism, I think one of the primary sources is that there is an institutional void, there is a disconnect, between Koreans in the United States and the primary political institutions in this country. So, one of the things political scientists really focus on when thinking about a group politically is, do they identify as Democrats or as Republicans? Political scientists need to know about a person, which side they identify with. More than half the Korean-Americans don't identify with either party. Other kinds of things we look at are levels of political trust, levels of political efficacy, and those for Korean-Americans are significantly lower than they are for other groups in the U.S. And perhaps, again, snapshot here is in terms of political contact to an elected official because there's something you want to ask them about or for, Koreans-Americans are half as likely as other Asians in the U.S. to engage in that mode of political participation.

In terms of promise there are two points. Korean-Americans are more politically interested, despite the fact that they are less participatory, or at least they report having higher levels of political interests than other Asian groups in the United States. So, in this survey, 21% of the entire sample of Asian-Americans report that they just have no political interest at all, and only 10% of Korean-Americans report that they have absolutely no political interest. The second

important political reason to have more hope that Koreans can become politicized in the future is that there is a high degree of identification as Korean-Americans. So, we asked how people choose to think of themselves, we asked if you see yourself as Asian-American, Korean, just American, as Korean-American, and a large majority of Koreans choose to think of themselves as Korean-Americans, a hyphenated identity, much more so then the other groups. And along with that a very high portion of Korean-Americans think that what happens to other Koreans in this country significantly affects what happens to them. An academic jargon would call that a sense of linked fate. And two out of three Korean-Americans think that their fate is linked to other Koreans in the U.S. and by comparison for non-Korean Asian groups that number is about closer to 40%.

The last point here, and then I'll conclude, is that Koreans are more likely to communicate that their sense of identity and solidarity as a Korean-American is politically significant. Some of the other questions that we ask is, if you had to choose between two political candidates who are otherwise equal except to the fact one of them is Korean and the other is not Korean, would you be more willing to vote for the Korean candidate? And 75% of Korean-Americans said that they would. Reference point for non-Korean Asian Americans is closer to 60%. So, that identity is likely to be significant if this institutional void, this relationship that Koreans in the U.S. have with these political institutions develops into a stronger link.

G. Lee: Okay. Thank you very much. Professor Thomas Kim, seven minutes.

Thomas P. Kim (Korea Policy Institute): Seven minutes? I'm actually used to speaking to the media and having about 30 seconds, or every once in a while I'll have a little bit longer, so I suppose I could look on the bright side and say that seven minutes feels like an eternity.

What I'm going to do today is, I was asked to come onto this project as someone who was involved in building, and specifically maintaining, specifically, a Korean-American think tank that has been active now for about four years; we went public about four years ago. And so today I'm going to briefly introduce the work that I'm doing and discuss opportunities and challenges, specifically focusing on one part of this work, opportunities and challenges for Korean academics in the broader sense of that term to articulate a public voice and perhaps engage in some kind of policy discourse. Now I should point out that I'm talking about people who are largely outside of the Beltway.

Let me start by briefly introducing the think tank that I helped found, the Korea Policy Institute. It's a think tank that's very specifically Korean-American, and is dominated by and driven by one-and-a-half and second generation Korean-Americans. We have some intergenerational conversation going on, but this is really a think tank that is moving forward for people who, to put it in terms that might make sense, are taught in conversation what goes on in South Korea. It's a think tank composed by people, driven by people, who are not driven by a particular historical memory of South Korea totalitarianism, who are not driven by some notion of the glory days, 1980s democratization, but instead are really driven by Korean-Americans who have experienced particular tensions, with regards to their experience as Korean-Americans. So in the short time that we've been active, we've managed to get our presence on a variety of local and national media. We've managed to get on CNN with Anderson Cooper, NBC's Today Show,

have a presence in *New York Times*, *USA Today*, *International Herald Tribune*, etc., etc. The impetus for the Korea Policy Institute came out of the concern in the Korean-American community that around 2004 the conversation that we were having, the public conversation we were having, about U.S. policy towards Korea was too narrow and too skewed toward perspectives that some of us were concerned would lead to some sort of military outbreak. Certainly, something we can say about virtually all Korean-Americans is that you may be conservative, progressive, moderate, or whatnot, or be completely apolitical as the case may be, but virtually no Korean-American actually wanted to have any military conflagration with North Korea in 2004. Part of the impetus also was noting some of the Korean-American voices that are out there, back at that time actually, were militating some force of attack. I remember being at an event listening to a particular Korean-American leader talking about the desirability of dropping U.S. bombs on the North Korean leadership, so as to take out their head. I remember thinking about how incredibly irresponsible in the context in the possibility for further death and destruction that could happen in the South, as well of course the North. So, it emerged out of this notion that there needed to be a pragmatic Korean-American voice, but in the context of the Bush administration of course, because it is a response to the Bush administration policies and to a conversation going on at that time. The kinds of voices that I think came out of both the Korea Policy Institute at that time, as well as more broadly Korea scholars in general, ended up being due to the Bush administration, the conversation that was a frame of the Bush administration in the first place.

So, that moves me to talking about some of the ways in which my paper is going to move forward, and first of all, to point out that much of the academic involvement coming out of

Korea scholarship circles and Korean-American academic circles is a response to the deteriorating relations that occurred between the U.S and Korea, South and North, during the Bush administration. Some of you perhaps are familiar with the alliance of scholars concerned about Korea, and as the name, to some extent gives away, was devised precisely around this time in part because, frankly, they were concerned about what the course of current policy, or possible course of current policy, at that time that would take us. So, part of what this means is that academics were interested in, and again I use this term broadly, as people that were credentialed in some academic form. Part of what this means is that with a continuing conflict with North Korea, and of course the conversation that exists now about transforming relations, about transforming the alliance with South Korea, that there are certainly opportunities, there continue to be opportunities for academic to make a difference at the level of popular conversation, at least there is a space where Korean-American scholars specifically can play a role. That is to say significant opportunities exist to become a larger part of the U.S.-Korea relationship. Now let's not kid ourselves, there's not usually a whole lot of demand for Korea scholars to speak on demand in the media or to become, no one inside the Beltway is actually looking for a whole lot of input, although certainly one could argue that there needs to be scholarly intellectual conversation in the Beltway. But there are, on the other hand, continuous news hooks, again because of the tension between the U.S. and both Koreas, the possibility for diplomacy, and also, of course, because of the particular history that the U.S has with the Korean peninsula, there's no shortage of news hooks that occur habitually in any given year. June 25th and July 27th roll around and I always get phone calls, as do many other people in the institute. So, I should point out though, because of the, I guess I'd say, the media policymakers are often unaware of Korea and U.S.-Korea relations and this can heavily influence them, the content and the impact of what

scholars say in the public sphere, and much of what is said ends up being very basic, given this low-level awareness of various issues. The flip side of that though, is that the general ignorance of these issues, is scholars have quite a role that they can play in educating and correcting some of the most egregious problems, with regard to making sure there is a full and fair conversation, a principle conversation about some of these tensions.

So, along those lines the paucity, the relative paucity, of Korean-American organizations, individuals and organizations seeking to engage the public, or seeking to engage the political system inside the Beltway, provides openings to intellectuals who actually wish to become part of conversation. So, now there's a significant downside to that, and I'm going to get to that in a second. But, the point is that it's not like there are a whole lot of credentialed Korean-Americans beating down the door to talk to people.

So, Korean-American scholars face, I'm going to shift to talking about challenges here. There are significant challenges in taking the analyses going on in scholarly academic circles outside the Beltway into having some kind of policy or discursive impact, and certainly I think it's fair to say, with few exceptions, U.S.-based American scholars' academic analyses have been largely absent inside the Beltway policy circles. The reasons for this, I think, are complex. One of the reasons maybe, that we as academics quite simply are beholden to other terms we have, many of us have a level of job security with tenure, and professional advancement doesn't depend on really whether or not anyone listens to us. It doesn't depend on whether our policy recommendations get implemented in any serious way, and I think partly what that does is open up scholars to have a more full conversation. My sense of it, and again I think I have to study a

lot more, is that inside the Beltway there are certain kinds of conversations that are much more difficult to have.

Seems like I got about one minute here, so let me close by saying, back to a point on Korean-American scholars, I mentioned on one hand there are real opportunities, but on the other hand opportunities to influence conversation. If you want there to be some kind of policy impact, there needs to be some meeting at some sort of institution or organization that puts you in a position to be in a conversation within decision-making circles, and so that's a real lack and is based upon all underdevelopment of Korean-American civil society. So, I have a last section that's really about efforts to engage the media and challenges that I have seen myself that other academics face working, specifically with South Koreans, but I think I'll just past that up for now. So, thank you.

G. Lee: So, thank you very much. So, I think I have to give both of you two minutes for critique.

T. Lee: We just lost a minute, first I had to adjust to your time zone and now three minutes is shortened to two. Okay, I have just three quick points, which I can make in two minutes or less. One is just an observation. I think what pairs our two papers is a common effort to build community from this side of the Pacific on these sets of issues, one from a top-down perspective looking at think tanks and academics, where I think the emphasis is on top-down inputs into decision-making, and mine from bottom-up perspectives of Korean-Americans, where I think the focus is more political engagement and rising demands for accountability that the interest of the Korean-American community get somehow represented over policy debates in things like free trade and other kinds of issues. The question related to that is, from your standpoint is looking to

build a think tank with scholarly inputs, who are the scholars speaking for, are they speaking for themselves, or is there in any way they're speaking for a broader set of Korean-American interests? And if the two of them work together as part of a tandem strategy to try to build community, is there a sequencing issue of which needs to come first or which is prior?

Second quick point is from the standpoint of trying to generate lead-level inputs into decision-making, and I raised this point earlier today, why the focus on academics. Are academics the right form of lead-level actors within the current American communities, or should we also look to business leaders, community leaders, religious leaders and so on?

And then finally from the standpoint of trying to build community, what are other kinds of groups you can look to as best cases, to see what's happened in those groups? Do you look to Jews in the United States, African Americans historically, other Asian national origin groups?

G. Lee: Okay, Professor Kim….

T. Kim: Just to clarify, I'm commenting on his paper first? Okay. Let me first say that Dr. Lee's paper is for anyone looking for a serious demographic portrait of Korean-Americans today. There isn't a lot of data on Korean-Americans, not a lot of original data, that's collected specifically for Korean-Americans. So, if you're interested in this stuff, this is definitely where that work is happening. So, rather than being disappointed, I was actually quite pleased, I'm looking forward to seeing the rest of it.

So, I just have a couple quick questions. Dr. Lee talks about, he prefaces, much of the paper is about diversity on some level, or different nuanced ways we can think about Korean-Americans

and at the same time, he points out that there are a couple of dominant ways, one coming from South Korea, the other coming from within the United States, ways in which those nuances and those internal differences actually harmonize, and so he points to ways in which primordial identity is imposed by Koreans and he also points to ways in which Koreans can harmonize into, more broadly into, some sort of notion of the model minority myth, or alternatively, later on, some notion of the peril. And, I guess I'm interested in getting his ideas about how Korean-Americans interested in participating in politics can effectively navigate this reality of internal diversity at the same time navigating externally imposed harmonization coming from inside the U.S. Now, that's usually where the conversation stops in ethnic politic circles, in terms of that conversation, but in the context of this particular event and in this book, you have to ask the next question, which is how are these folks functioning and navigating the external harmonization being imposed by South Koreans, who oftentimes see themselves as potential allies of these Korean-Americans?

The second question I would have is, Dr. Lee has talked about how Korean-American political participation is low and suggested that political parties haven't done a marvelous job mobilizing Korean-Americans, and it strikes me again in the context of building some sort of cooperative relationship that in South Korea much of that work has been done by civil society organizations that have effectively incorporated the ordinary Korean into some level of participation. One of the things that comes out in the context, I think, this panel later on as well in Dr. Lee's talk, is that there don't seem to be a lot of organizations in the United States that Korean organizations generate or help to mobilize coherent Korean-American voices, and so it seems to me that one of the challenges might be to how do you develop partnerships with South Korea in the absence of

organizations, because certainly when South Koreans are reaching out to folks in the United States, Korean-Americans in the United States, they're doing it on an organizational basis whether it be party or civic society. So, I'm interested in when he looks at the survey research on Korean-Americans, what are possible organizing principles that could bring Korean-Americans to develop organizations capable of both the U.S. discourse and policy? And I think I should probably end there.

G. Lee: Okay, thank you very much. For the benefit of time, we're going to move on to the next subject right away. We have a pretty good gender balance in this project. I think that is one of the most rare occasions in South Korean projects. Good thing we're funded by the Korean Foundation, I guess. And we have two female professors; Professor Kang Yoonhee is going to make presentation on Korean civil society. Seven minutes.

Yoonhee Kang (Kookmin University): Thank you. My thesis is about Korean civil society and its role in trust building between South Korea and USA. As probably many of you know, Korea saw unprecedented growth of the NGOs in the 1990's and now Korean NGOs have become influential actors with the ability to affect the formation and implementation of South Korean government policies. Despite these growing importance, relatively little attention has been paid to their role in strengthening the U.S.-South Korea relationship, and it is because the U.S. and Korean relationship is often understood as the alliance of the relations which prioritize security issues over political, and economic issues over any other issues. As a result non-governmental ties between the U.S. and Korea had a traditional importance compared to the relative roles of the government in defining the relationship between the two countries.

So, communications between the civil society actors of the two countries have not been developed to a sufficient level, and a lack of interaction and lack of information sharing and also lack of dialogue between Korean civil society actors and their U.S. counterparts had often led to an escalation of the distrust of the two countries. As a result, the Korean civil society actors were largely presented as anti-American both by American media and also by some Korean conservative medias.

In my papers I dealt with general overview of the Korean civil society, but I will skip this part and just go to the . . . I just want to make a few points. I have found out that many Korean civil society actors are not anti-Americans. Some of them have been anti-American in attitude, but many of them have changed their attitudes and this is because both sides, the American side and also the Korean civil society side, have made an effort to understand each other. For instance, the American government provided opportunities for Korean NGO activities, to come to the USA and to come to look around the American civic groups. The exchange of persons programs, such as Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship or the International Visitor Leadership Program, provided opportunities for Korean NGOs to come to the USA. For instance, well-known civic activist lawyer Bob Watson was invited by the Eisenhower program in 1999 and he published about American NGOs and think tanks and from this book we realized that he's not anti-American. He wanted to know more about how the American NGOs and think tanks operate.

There are many other cases. For instance, one of the civil society activists whom I interviewed was a student activist who read anti-American struggle in the 1980s but now he acknowledges the importance of the Korean and U.S. alliance and he voluntarily works for Korean-U.S. Vision Association, this is another example. So as you can see the exchange programs contributed to the

mutual understanding of the American and Korean civil societies and inspired new civic activities and the sharing of how to fundraise, how to operate, and how to lobby the governments. Although there are some activists who are still, some activists who are, anti-American in attitude, but we do better not to exaggerate this factor. One of the activists pointed out that the exchange of persons program may not be sufficient to establish strong ties between Korean and U.S. civil societies. According to her, it would be better for the American government to build direct contact with these Korean civil society groups and provide financial and moral support to them. For instance the foundations, such as the Ebert Foundation or the Foundation of Germany, were doing this kind of activities, and they were doing quite good with this, that works with the Koreans NGOs and civil society groups.

I will move to the international ties and conflation of Korean civil society groups. Many of the Korean civil society groups were homegrown and they didn't actively seek out international ties in the 1990s, but their attitude has changed. Now many Korean NGOs are making efforts to extend their talks beyond their country, beyond Korea, and I think this change in attitude came in the event of globalization and also with the development of information technologies. Korean NGOs now actively participate in international conferences, and seminars, and making ties with international organizations, and inviting NGO activities, such as inviting specialists from abroad, from America, also preparing projects jointly with their foreign partners. And to my surprise, many Korean NGOs now provide information in their home pages in English, so this facilitates them to read international networks.

And another thing I found interesting is the many Korean NGOs' international activities are rather focused in Asia, exceptions are the private think tanks and NGOs with a clear focus on

security, peace movements, and Korean unification or Korean problems. These civil society actors clearly understand the importance of maintaining access to the American thesis makers and so they want to have channels through the American think tankers in order to make their voice heard in Washington D.C. or to change things in the direction they want. Okay, I can just stop here.

G. Lee: Thank you very much. Professor Moon…

Katharine H.S. Moon (Wellesley College): Is it on? Must be a good system, it's not echoing in my ears. Okay, my paper, or my chapter, once we all make this into a book, actually bridges – and I sat here with these Korean-Americans referring to each other as Dr. Lee and Dr. Kim, and I thought, *wow, talk about our multiple and versatile identities,* you know, when you're used to going "hey", with our respective Korean colleagues teaching us better manners. In our morning session we have quickly adapted, but I'll go back to the American way. My paper bridges Taeku's work on demographic analysis on Korean-Americans and their political participation. Some of the questions he raises, I hope to begin to answer. Also, Tom's work, I also try to work on ethnic Korean-Americans, Korean-Americans as ethnic groups who are now beginning to become fledgling actors in foreign policy, and will they, can they, might they serve as a bridge, a mediating group, that helps build trust and cooperation or perhaps not. And in that regard, my paper intersects with some of the questions and findings that Dr. Kang addresses in her paper. So we really do speak to one another in this regard.

When we talk about civil society, you can say, "why is it important for foreign relations or bilateral relations?" and I would answer to you both from democratic theory and democratic

politics and alliance theory in the world of scholarship, that it's very important. What people feel to one another and offer to one another, give to another, sacrifice for one another does matter in supporting alliances and supporting trade. Consumers as individuals, we are all consumers, we could be boycotting and hurting bilateral relationships and thereby creating or increasing or adding mistrust, distrust problems. And those who study alliances, most people worry about the architecture, the structure, the operational issues of the alliances and especially the Korea-U.S. bilateral alliance, that's what most people focus on. If you notice there were more people here when we had the security panel and then we leave, and this is a problem in Washington. And really the next time we do this we'll do domestic politics first, and force people to stay, and even offer them food if we have to. That's what we do at Wellesley College, my wonderful student Esther, serving as intern for Jae Ku's office, it's a nice little arrangement we have, but at Wellesley food brings people. Next time Sarah, we should think about force-feeding people to listen to domestic politics. At any rate, civil society relations are critical. In a democracy you need to have independent thinking, including not only ethnic groups, but by scholars, and organizations as Professor Kang pointed out, that come up with independent analysis and interest agendas and then a working democracy allows you to move those agendas forward, you may not always get what you want – famous song in American rock history – but at least in a working democracy you can try.

Civil society relations are also important because they can shape civil-military relations that support, legitimate, or not support and delegitimize the alliance structure or the alliance relationship. If two people do not support an alliance, and feel some kind of cooperative bond, the alliance does not last or the alliance has a hard time, and in my view I do more work related

to alliance issues related to domestic politics in Korea, and in my view some of the troubles we had in the early 2000s and even in the 1990s as well in the alliance relationship, comes out of a lack of civil military relations or civil society relationship that understands the alliance relationship and embraces it and supports it. The way I put it is, individuals as well as civil society organizations or NGOs serve as, as I call it, the human glue to a bilateral relationship or bilateral alliance.

In the past, and Professor Kang has this rich history, that I have asked her to do more of in our working session we have in the morning, a rich history of U.S.-Korea relations that we have at a civil society level stemming from the 1900s on, or really, even the late 19th century, where you had individuals as missionaries and others highly involved in reaching out to Korea, and Koreans reaching out to America. In a post-Korean War situation, who, which individual groups, make up the human glue? Well, missionaries still, American missionaries and now Korean missionaries are going all over the world and building social capital there as well as Christian capital. Also, U.S. military veterans, they served as a major interest group in the United States to make sure the losses and sacrifices they experienced during the war weren't going to go to waste. So there was a lot of support by veterans for pro-Korea policies. Most of them have died out, so you're losing that ground and we don't have many American missionaries that are that active in Korea anymore because Korea doesn't need it, it's highly hot with Christian fervor on its own. And then the other groups, the Peace Corps, the American Peace Corps, we don't have that anymore because Korea didn't need it for a long, long time. And then I asked myself, those actually were critical human glue groupings that we now no longer have, that helps bridge the two societies together.

Now what do we have? We still have American military service personnel there, but they've been having a hell of a time with a lot of protests and a lot of problems in civil-military relations in the last 15 years. I didn't even go so far as to say the last two or three decades. We also have Korean-Americans as ex-pats who are going out to Korea to work in corporations, as well as teaching English, as well as going to school, Masters programs at Ewha, Seoul National, Korea University, etc., and you have random Americans going out to teach as English teachers, but how these groups sense their role in Korea as mediators is very unclear, and the kinds of experiences American service personnel will return to America with are going to be very, very different from the experiences that informed the 1950s generations who actually believed they were fighting for freedom and anticommunism and much more noble causes then what today's soldiers may feel. So, I point that out to emphasize, if you wonder why we have this panel and why human beings' interest groups and ethnic groups and civil society groups are important, they're important in and of themselves, but they're vital to maintaining bilateral relations, and we have had trouble especially during most of the 2000' in this category of civil-military and civil society relations.

The questions I ask are threefold in my chapter. Why Korean-Americans have yet to meet the criteria set out by social scientists for successful effective influence in U.S. policy making? Some of these criteria include organizational capacity, group unity, and voter participation in terms of electoral significance. Three – salience and resonance of the political message; four – the ability to push open the door, that means in government; and five – access to government actors, especially in Congress; and six – mutually supportive relationships between politicians and ethnic interest groups. Korean-Americans meet none of these criteria, but they meet some of them in small ways. So I'm just going to very quickly run through why they don't meet most of

these criteria and then the couple cases of more successful activism or influence in Washington, D.C.

One key thing to think about in terms of why Korean-Americans and other Asian Americans have not been particularly successful as groups in Washington has to do with American society. Asian Americans still are not considered full Americans even if we have three, four generations of Korean-Americans, as I do, living and growing up in the U.S. because of our phenotypical differences. Unlike African-Americans and Latino-Americans, the inevitable question behind many general populations' heads is, "Are you really American?" And a well-known scholar, Paul Watanabe has referred to Asian Americans as "disguised Americans," that any minute their "real Asian-ness" is going to pop out and they're going to favor the homeland, and, of course, the internment of Japanese-Americans is the prime example, it happened. Another problem, an obstacle, that Korean-Americans or any ethnic group faces, is the suspicion in the scholarly world, and the policy world, and in the media world, and in the public that ethnic groups are derailing the American interest, or the national interest, and moving American national policy toward particularistic interests that favor their homeland or country of heritage. Sam Huntington feared this and more recently Steve Walt and John Mearsheimer put out articles and a book that created a lot of controversy because lobbying survives and thrives in the U.S. that basically silences critical debates and that deters policy from alternative creative ways of solving or addressing the Middle East problems so there's skepticism involved in foreign policy in general.

The next part here really refers to Korean-Americans and the lack of organization or capacity. I mainly want to point out one problem here among Korean-Americans, there are many, but one is a generational division. In Washington everyone is used to hearing about generational gaps, or

the generational gap in Korea and therefore the generational gap being responsible for the deterioration of the U.S.-Korea relationship, which I don't personally buy and I'm actually writing a book so you should read it next year when it comes out that argues against that logic, but there is a genuine generational gap among Korean-Americans. Everything from the way they do politics or political engagement, when I interviewed . . . How many do I have?

G. Lee: Thirty seconds.

Moon: Wow! Okay, when I interviewed different leaders of Korean American organizations, they said the older generation doesn't want to do e-mail, they don't want to do e-mail; they want to meet face-to-face. The younger generation doesn't have time to meet face-to-face. So, even on that level there is a huge difference. But, more significantly, the older generation tends to be more anticommunist, conservative in leadership and hierarchical forms of organization, and still holding onto the pocketbooks, financial coffers, in organizations, especially churches. Korean churches are the least willing to turn over the generational mantle to the younger generation and this is a problem, given how important the church is. Also, Korean newspapers, listen to Korean news, Korean TV, Korean videos and soap operas, and they're much more interested in Korean politics in Korea than American politics in America. Korean-Americans, on the other hand, the younger generation, they don't listen to Korean news, watch Korean election results, etc., they actually care about American issues, elections, they identify as Republicans, Independents, or Democrats, and they're also more in tune with pan-Asian issues and other ethnic American issues, like immigration for example, or civil rights. So, you've got different areas of interest as well as different styles of organizing, and then genuine conflict when it comes to working together, and I will just give you the example of what was considered a very successful Korean-

American organizing effort that led to the House Resolution on the comfort women, all about three years ago or so. The House Resolution that passed supported the redress of comfort women, and, in a way condemned Japan. Many Korean-Americans and people in Washington considered that a huge success, that Korean-Americans had arrived on the congressional scene and the D.C. scene. Yes and no. I say that what happened internally is, even if there was an external veneer of success because you had a resolution pass, internally the generation divide, I wouldn't go so far as to say exploded, but was very, very evident and when I talk to some of the activists, especially younger who were involved, they were so frustrated with the older generation of activists who wanted to take claim for whatever success there was and wanted to control the media, especially the Korean media. Leaks would come out, which would make the actual organizing work of the younger generation very, very difficult and so these kind of generational divides are not abstract, they actually play out in campaigns such as getting the House Resolution for the comfort women passed. I can say more about that if you're interested but for the sake of time, I'll try to wrap up.

The other thing here is that Korean-Americans seem most successful in a campaign or social movement when they deemphasize Korean-ness and emphasize universality, universal issues like human rights, or issues that play well to the American psyche, about freedom, about liberty, about equality. So in that regard, both the comfort women issue and the North Korean human rights campaigns had been relatively successful in capturing attention, both on the Congressional level and media level, and think tank level, etc., and has to do with the framing of the issue, not just the issue itself.

My last point here, and I promise I really will shut up after that, is that Korean-Americans, when we ask why we are not so organized and coherent, is because we lack a single pressing issue area

that brings people together that we can articulate. Jewish-American groups, whether they are on the left or right or middle, whether they disagree on tactics or ultimate goals, agree on the survival of the state of Israel. Cuban-Americans until very recently had an overarching issue, which was anti-Castroism. Armenian-Americans have had the Turkish genocide. Korean-Americans don't have a single issue that drives and attracts the group. In that sense, it serves as a problem bringing different people together. On the other hand as a scholar, having anything as a single-issue driver scares me, because you end up losing the richness and diversity of other issues and perspectives. So I will stop.

G. Lee: Thank you very much; again I have to move you to a different time zone. I'm going to give ninety seconds for Professor Kang, and sixty seconds for Professor Moon.

Y. Kang: I read Katharine Moon's paper with great pleasure. The paper is intellectually stimulating and is full of informative things, and I just have one question. It seems to me the Korean-American community in general is quite conservative based on the Korean-American churches, but South Korean civil society actors, normally the majority of them are very progressive. So I wonder if there is any possibility of some kind of cooperation between them?

Moon: That's an excellent question; I struggle with that in some of my research. My one question, we have already had a working session where we've exchanged critiques, so we've already shared our intellectual dilemmas here, but one question to you, Professor Kang is, there is no mention among the Korean side in either Professor Lee's work on Korean identity or your work on Korean civil society of the generation of Koreans who are basically growing up in America as students at a young age on. I'm not talking about foreign students on a college level;

we're talking about grade school, kindergarten, nursery school, on to high school. And this is an issue I've always been concerned and curious about, when they return, just as Koreans may look to Korean-Americans as an infinity group that mediates, what role might this group play if any. I'm very curious about that. Related are Korean demographic changes. We talked about Korean demographics here, but we know, those of us who study Korea, know Korean demographics are changing, and in the year 2050 about 10% of the Korean population, the total population, will have shrunk dramatically because Korea has a rapidly aging population and lowest birth rate countries, and that is what it is in the world, but you have an increase of migrants, and foreign brides, and foreigners coming in creating what President Roh and what President Lee called multicultural families, multicultural societies. As Korean society diversifies, what might happen to issues of cooperation, trust, distrust, when it comes not only to the U.S., but also to other countries and regions? And also, might the diversification decrease the emphasis on the United States? So I'll stop there.

G. Lee: Okay, thank you for very good questions. Now I will open the floor for questions and comments. In fact, we have an expert on Asian issues in Korea and its implication on Korea-U.S. relations over there, Professor Shin Song Hong, he wrote an article on that issue, and perhaps he can share some comments on that. But anyway, we're going to take a few questions.

Guest 1: If no one else has a question . . . is this mic on? I'll make a comment anyway, mainly directed mostly to Katharine. I had some questions elsewhere in the country, outside Washington. I think most Americans view Korean-Americans as people who excel and succeed compared to most Americans, and of course I've heard the opposite, self-limiting, from Korean-Americans. And then I think about what most Americans know about KORUS FTA and so forth, I actually

have a cousin of mine who thought it to be some musical group, the KORUS FTA, maybe a rock musical group, then many of them not realizing that we still have an alliance with Korea. And I have the impression that in Korea that at least people know what the KORUS FTA is and that it is a U.S. alliance. I don't know how much this matters, but we said it had something to do with domestic politics. Certainly there are factions, but there are a lot of people who don't know what they're talking about when asked. So I ask, does it matter?

Moon: Does it matter that the American public doesn't know? Yeah, I think it does matter. It matters and it doesn't matter. If we look at it in terms of how these policies get made and ratified, it's really the elites. But that's why, when Abe Kim was giving his talk, one of the things I wanted to ask, he talked about veto players, but these are the elites. Whom do they represent, right, and they represent their constituency. You have multiple smaller potential veto players behind the larger veto players. So, if Americans are not informed, this is a problem. So, they may be telling their Congressperson things, or their Congressperson may be picking up things that are based on ignorance or just indifference. So in that regard I think it matters.

I think on another level it matters, American ignorance on Korea really offends Koreans. And I know this, and you know this, we hear this all the time. In Korea, I call it, it's an over-magnified look at America from a Korean perspective, and an under-examined, you know there's no lens on Korea from an American perspective. So in terms of, Professor Kim talked about inequity and inequality, we already have an inequality of interest among the two publics, for obvious reasons. U.S. looms large in Korea, for all the reasons people have mentioned; Korea is just one country among many for Americans. So in those regards it does matter and here is where I make a pitch to the Korea Foundation, not only the Korea Foundation, American foundations have a

responsibility. We need to reach out, and also as educators, we need to reach out to younger grades. It's not just endowing fancy chairs at Howard University, or Georgetown University, or wherever it is. That makes so little difference in terms of actually teaching the American public. What matters is that American children and American teachers in Kansas, and Oklahoma, and Ohio, and Michigan, and New York, etc. learn about Korea, and know even that there's a difference between Korea and Japan, which a lot of Americans don't, or Korea and China. U.S. Postal Service can take lessons very quickly. When I have gone, I want to send a package to South Korea, they say, "North or South?", because I've put South Korea but they're looking at the computer and I tell them very, very patiently we're not permitted to send messages to the North. No clue, and we're talking about government employees here.

The level of ignorance is high and the level of misperception and expectation on the Korean side is also too high towards America and there we generally have an unequal situation. But, that is something I am hopeful about, because that's where education and other investments, social capital investments can matter.

G. Lee: Dr. Jae Ku, can we have ten more minutes? Alright, we're going to take a few more questions. That gentleman over there, and two more questions there and then we'll answer the questions.

Guest 2 (Michael Choi, Dept. of Commerce): Michael Choi from the U.S. Commerce Department. Perhaps this isn't very relevant, but I'm very interested in Korean identity given the current demographic trends, low birth rate, high aging rate, and apparently one of the highest

OACD suicide rates, and I find particularly keen a recent celebrity suicide, one just happened this week. So how do such trends affect Korea, Korean identity?

Guest 3 (Raelyn Campbell, Former NBR): Raelyn Campbell, formerly NBR, now private consultant. Just wanted to pick up on the group unity comments that Kathy was making, and ask whether or not formulating a sense of unity within the Korean American community is a mission impossible? You talked about the generational gap, but it seems to me that there are a lot of other factors influencing Korean-Americans perspectives on U.S.-Korean relations, but also general U.S. policy. And a Korean-American living in Senator Levin's district is going to take a different perspective on the KORUS FTA. You know, different views depending on where people live, what industry people are engaged in, what people are around them, their community? I'm just curious as to how you would propose building the trust and building the mutual interest that would be required to draw the Korean-American community together, let alone the Koreans and the Americans.

Guest 4 (Daniel Walfield, George Washington University): I'm a Masters Degree student. My question is, to what extent does the tremendous number of South Koreans studying abroad in the U.S. affect Korean perceptions of America?

G. Lee: Okay, one last question.

Guest 5: I'm one of the old guys you mentioned, who was drafted and sent to there in 1959, and I of course was quite broken down in those days, but I liked it so much I took my discharge over there and got a teaching job at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies when it was just beginning. I loved it there, I spent three semesters and then I came back to the States. Then after 30 years, I

went back in 1995, and of course I don't have to tell you the changes to the subway system and all of that, but I taught again for three semesters so it was a nice comparison to make. My general impression was nothing has changed. It's as lovable as it was at that time. The prejudice against Japan is still there and is alive as always. There was a gentleness, a sentimentality among the students. The differences were, they could speak better English, they were savvy in a way, and they were all wired up one way or another. And instead of sitting in the old tea rooms listening to Beethoven on black market hi-fi sets and drinking ersatz coffee and dressed in their uniforms, they sat in their coffee shops and sort of mooned about, it was much more plush. But it was striking to me how really similar, I just almost want to say there is a Korean character, which I'm sure you may disagree with, there is a basic Korean character is what it is and is quite attractive to some of us. And I wouldn't like to see it change actually.

G. Lee: Thank you very much. I think I would perhaps like to give 90 seconds for responses from each presenter. Let me start with Professor Taeku.

T. Lee: I'll just quickly, Korean-American group unity and mission impossible. I would say the mission is less impossible over time. Unless history takes a hold of that question. What I mean by both those things is, as Korean-Americans become a more mature population within the United States, the idea of the group unity around Korea becomes less and less tenable. On the other hand, I think one of the things that we know about group identity formation and when it becomes politicized as response to defining threats. Something happens in the theater of foreign affairs such as Koreans in the United States become identified as an "other" and a perpetual foreigner in a very clear way that becomes a defining point.

T. Kim: What I would add to this, or maybe the way I'd modify this notion of group unity and also in some other threats that Taeku brought up in his comments, I'd suggest even before you start thinking about some kind of notion, individual preferences exist that would develop some kind of group unity that you'd have to start thinking about developing some kind of serious infrastructure. Where there could be a kind of conversation amongst potentially more diverse set of Korean organizations, institutions, that could actually work and come together and actually address the serious differences that do exist and this would be something that would have more capacity or potential to really do something. And along those lines, the talk I gave was focused on academics, but of course it need not be just academics. In fact there's no reason why academics are the most critical or important part. In fact, it's just the work that I do, because it's just the skill set that I have and what I'm capable of doing, but certainly what I think needs to happen is that there needs to be a much broader and much more interested Korean-American infrastructure. In part also because if you're talking about real cooperation, and I didn't get to this point in my talk, if you're talking about real cooperation with South Korea civic groups, and actually, totally down with this idea, we really need this sort of human globe, if you're actually going to have that, then you really need to have some sort of Korean-American commitment to building the kinds of organizations and institutions that not just get information from different civic groups in South Korea, but also are able to hold their own and actually have positions and be able to negotiate positions both with Korean-Americans, but also in conversation with South Korean groups. So, that's where I would point in terms of thinking about developing a kind of coherent political analysis that different folks could get behind.

Y. Kang: Okay, I will answer the question about the growing number of the students studying in America. Actually, I wanted to include this factor in my paper but I couldn't. The thing is, there are more students studying in America, but they are not organized, so they are not doing much about building trust between the two countries and if these kind of students think about their own career development and if they don't do much about the Korean society in Korea then they will not have much influence, and also the Korea society will be just bipolarized.

Moon: I'll go to Raelyn's question. I don't want to leave you with the impression that Koreans are not cohering because they are. Bottom line, we are in a transitional situation right now, the current situation. We have several quite large organizations. New York, Queens, has the Korean-American Voters committee, which focuses on Korean-Americans becoming American citizens and voters. So they do massive voter registration drives and also make sure people go out and actually vote. They teach Korean-Americans how to address their congressman. And, I was just recently at one of their annual banquets, I was their keynote speaker, and it was hundreds of people, and just about all the Asian-American and non-Asian-American, Queens, Flushing area, local assembly people, local counsel people they showed up and they did the typical hand shaking and then nodding and whatever. They wanted to be seen among the Korean-Americans, so I said, "Wow, this is something, I've never seen this before." So, yes, it's happening, it will grow. The leader, who just stepped down, of the KAVC, I interviewed him, he said he looks at his project as a decades-long project, so time. And Korean-Americans, Koreans are not patient. I think Korean-Americans have learned to be a little more patient living in America, but he looks at it as first ten years we do this, next ten years, next ten years, so there's this ambitious vision.

Right now, in Washington D.C. there's this National Association of Korean-Americans that also works on voter registration, civic responsibility, but also has as its mandate, improving U.S.-Korea relations. So I had sent around e-mails to come, but I don't know if anybody has, but at any rate . . . So that's just two, but then there are church organizations that are involved in North Korea human rights, obviously very, very active, and comfort women issues, and such. Whether they will just stay, whether they will become more secularized in their interest area, that's up for grabs as they grow in power, but when I interviewed one group out in California, the leader, he liked having access to Washington, he liked being here and being able to walk into Congress people's doors, and there was a sense that we are growing, we are going to be players.

And, let me just end with a quote by a very, very philosophical Korean-American who is also an organizer here in the Washington area. When I interviewed him he said, "Look, talk about patience," he said, "Just wait 150 years, we will join, not figure out how to join American society. Kimchi will be a common American food and we will have streets and towns called Seoul Street, just as we have Germantown." So I leave you with that.

CLOSING REMARKS

G. Lee: Thank you very much. As for the question about Asian society, demographic changes, and increasing suicide rate, perhaps what the Korean society needs the most at the moment is a social safety net. I think Korean society is disintegrating very rapidly. I think we really do need a social safety net in Korea.

I would like to thank the participants and the audience for your patience and your good questions and comments. And now I would like to invite Dr. Jae Ku for closing remarks. Thank you very much.

Jae H. Ku (U.S.-Korea Institute): I really hate to be the barrier between you and happy hour, so I'll try to keep this as short as possible. What Katharine said, you see snippets of Korea becoming mainstream every day. I was just two streets over at nice American pub having a hamburger for lunch, and on the menu it said, "Korean barbeque chicken wings," and I said, "What the heck is that?" so I ordered it, and it's Yang Nam Chicken, and I thought, *what a creative concept*. I think that this morning, I should say this afternoon, there are several conferences in Washington. Today, I was over across town at another conference, but this conference really, I think, speaks volumes of the people in this room who are Korean, American, and people like me who are Korean-American. Who, figuratively, we've always said, we are that bridge, and I recently feel like I am playing my small part in bridging that.

This afternoon, with Professor Bong Youngshik's presentation, "Trust versus Interest", I think in Washington, and Washington is a very slippery animal, and having moved back to Washington, you really get it. We're so disconnected from the rest of the world and the community in the

United States. I grew up in Kansas, so I always bring up Kansas like it's a foreign country. But, what you find in this town is that you have to have both trust and interest. And just yesterday I had a very interesting conversation with a colleague who gave me a rundown of what happened in the Toronto G20 summit meeting with Obama. So when Obama meets Hu Jintao and Obama has that kind of Obama speak, that kind of, "Hey man," and has had a relationship with Hu Jintao, and Obama broached the Cheonan incident, like we really need to come to terms with this, in which Hu Jintao crossed his arms, leaned back, and then took on the Foreign Ministry speak, and Obama was turned off and of course he came out with the press conference and then spoke very strongly. And, then some of that has to do with the kind of trust the current South Korean president has with this president and that interest alone. If it's interest alone, we might be in trouble, because if you're in Washington we think globally nonproliferation, but before MB, the two previous administrations were all about inter-Korean relations, proliferation was secondary to inter-Korean relations. So, we need, I think, both interest and trust.

And, I also notice the tension more so on the Korean side, the Korean participants, and perhaps as an American sitting here listening little bit more unduly negative than it really is. But there's a tension between equity, and we're still a small country. So, when it comes to trade we need the favors, we need the breaks, then when it comes to the political security side, it's, hey we should be given more accord, more respect, more this, and on the Washington side, we say we'll be more than happy to give you that, but we also take on some of the burden sharing. And, so we have challenges, we have obstacles, and to get over that it's not simply having the interest, I think having the trust with it.

In this town, I also have to have two hats, one that works on policy and the one that kind of has my academic interest, and my academic interest is really about civil society, Korean civil society, and Korean-American activism here. I was very intrigued with Professor Taeku Lee's research, and I completely agree with that, but I want to tease out some of the more positives that he mentioned. There are snippets of really bright lights out there; it's kind of like George Bush's thousand lights, if we can somehow connect them in the Korean-American community. And the research that I do at the Institute, Kathy's student is my intern, and I was just joking earlier that I have a real sweatshop upstairs with these busy bees. And one of the projects is Korean-American donors' giving. So, I know of no existing limited databases of Korean-American donor list that various individuals or various organizations may have, but for the past ten months I've had a team of interns going into the Federal Commission website, four pages of all variations of the Korean last name and downloading what they've given. It's now in the process of being put into a statistical package, then I will be able to tease out who they are, where they live, what do they do, etc. And just a preliminary, I gave this talk last fall where my presentation I pick up in '97 where a similar study had ended which shows political giving among Korean-American community to be really on a kind of rise, a very high rise. Absolute amount, depending on how you slice it, still very relatively small, but if you think about 1997 being about $100,000, right now it's beyond $3,000,000. And this only with cases of 'n' being 550. Right now my researchers tell me we've got a database of over 15,000 names that we've got to tease out the data for. And, these are useful because these kinds of data, I think, provide Korean-America groups and individuals with the kind of information I think that will help that next step. And, I always joke about this with friends, this will be great when I run for U.S. Congress, so don't tell that to my wife.

Again, what Professor Thomas Kim said, it's interesting because it's kind of a mirror image. If you're outside of the Beltway, you don't really know the Beltway, and if you're in the Beltway you really don't know. So I always thought the Korean-American scholars outside the Beltway were always Kathy and David Kang, so it is a communication breakdown. If you think about Korean-Americans in Washington D.C. that have some kind of influence, maybe not a whole lot of influence but certainly have influence like Victor Cha, Ambassador Song Kim, but I run this Institute and with what little I have, I try to make influence in providing donations, meetings, etc. of a colleague who runs the U.S. Institute of Peace. Victor Cha is the Korea Chair at CSIS. Scott Snyder is almost Korean-American and he runs the Asia Foundation Center for Korea Policy. So, what we have is generally a good collection of Korean-Americans who are I think are influential, or who are at the cusp of being influential.

And civil society – it's, depending on how you slice the bread, it's something that is very, very positive, but again Professor Taeku Lee, kind of shows the participation rate. But, that is also same in Korea too, the reflection, it's more of a reflection of the political society. And, I haven't had a chance to see all of these papers, and I would love to see Professor Yoonhee Kang's paper when it's finished. Korea civil society was always a measurement problem, too often we get bogged down with names and organizations and sometimes too often they get on TV and say, "We the civil society." What is that, what is the level of membership; who are they; what kind of depth do they have? And if civil society is about individuals making a claim collectively, then it is ultimately about citizen participation. And citizen participation in Asia, in Korea is not unique to that, beyond the periodic voting, is very thin. So sometimes academically we throw in the

words civil society and creation of social capital as if they're interchangeable, and clearly it's not. And, so academically I think that should be a point of research.

But, I'm really upbeat when you talk about this, and I remember a couple of years ago, Dr. Geun, when you invited me to participate in one of your seminars, I had complained that the level of discussion hasn't improved in the 20 years since I was a freshman at a college dorm having similar conversations. That's not true and I think the more I research, and the more I attend these conferences, and the more I get to learn about what other people are doing, it is I think that thousand points of light. If we can somehow manage to connect them, I think we'll get there much faster and I don't think it'll take 150 years. Thank you very much, Sarah.

Snyder: Thank you again to each of you, for joining us today, and again special thanks to the Korea Foundation for making this possible and to the U.S.-Korea Institute here at SAIS. Also, thank you for the excellent team support that we've had in putting this together. Just as we've seen today, this project is really the result of three years of research that looks at domestic and international actors, trends, and the characteristics that influence the relationships between the United States and South Korea. And we have the hope that, through conversations like these, that we will help strengthen and form understanding and relationships between our countries as well as understanding on the topics. Thank you very much for being part of the dialogue today, we look forward to seeing you at future events.