

Road to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

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Road to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

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PROLOGUE

The second Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) will be held in Seoul, South Korea, on March 26-27, 2012. This summit, officially named “The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” will be the largest such meeting held in Korea in modern Korean history, just as the 2010 session was the largest summit ever held in Washington, DC.

The first Nuclear Security Summit took place in April 2010 in Washington, DC at US President Barack Obama’s invitation. In his historic Prague speech on April 5, 2009, President Obama promoted “nuclear security” as one of three strategic goals, along with nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, to achieve his vision of “a world without nuclear weapons.”¹ In order to strengthen nuclear security, the President called for “new international efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years,” and proposed to hold a global summit in 2010.²

In order to materialize his policy ideas, President Obama personally chaired a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting that adopted the UNSC Resolution 1887 in September 2009. The resolution, which was unanimously adopted, agreed to convene a nuclear security summit in 2010, secure nuclear material within four years, minimize the use of highly enriched uranium, and facilitate international cooperation in order to prevent nuclear terrorism. Accordingly, the 2010 summit brought together leaders from 47 states and representatives from three international organizations—the UN, IAEA, and EU. Moreover, summit participants agreed to hold a second summit in Seoul two years later. After concluding the Washington Summit successfully, global attention has now turned to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

This paper looks at South Korean and international efforts to prepare for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and tries to answer the following questions: Why was Korea chosen as the second host state? What are the goals and significance of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit? What will be on the agenda, inherited and new, at the 2012 meeting and how was the Seoul Communiqué prepared? How has South Korea been preparing for this summit and its parallel events—the 2012 Nuclear Security Symposium for nongovernment organizations and the Nuclear Industry Summit? Finally, will there be more summits after a third meeting in 2014?

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2012 SEOUL SUMMIT

1. Background

While the Nuclear Security Summit was held largely in response to an initiative started by President Obama, the need for stronger measures to protect nuclear material and to prevent nuclear terrorism has been raised since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.

In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama warned that nuclear terrorism was “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” This warning was echoed in the 2010 Washington Communiqué, when it stated that “nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means.”

President Obama was not the first to highlight the danger of nuclear terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there had been repeated warnings. The UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 stated that it was “gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors...may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.” IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei also warned in his speech at the 2008 IAEA Annual Conference that “nuclear terrorism is the Number One security threat right now. If they get it, they will use it.”

Today’s world is such that political, security, and economic uncertainties are everywhere and expanding. International order and certainty under uni-polar, bi-polar, multi-polar, and balance of power systems are long gone, and a new and stable order has yet to come. One symptom has been an increasing number of terrorist attacks causing massive and indiscriminate destruction. Since 2000, there have been over 30 cases of terrorist attacks around the world with over 100 deaths. This trend may continue as global uncertainties remain.

According to a 2010 International Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM) report, there are over 2,100 tons of fissile material stock in the world—1,600 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and about 500 tons of separated plutonium³—enough to produce over 100,000 nuclear weapons. A large stock of HEU for civilian use is a cause for special concern since it is under far less protection than material for military use, and since the gun-type HEU bomb requires less engineering skills in assembly and explosion than the plutonium-core explosion bomb. The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database also shows that nuclear and radiological terrorism can occur, as there have been over 20 cases of illicit use or trade of HEU and plutonium from 1993 to 2011.⁴

Recognizing the serious danger of diversion of nuclear material to unauthorized uses or terrorist attacks, there have been intermittent international efforts to secure and protect this material.⁵ However, these efforts have never been strong, fast, or sufficient enough to keep the world secure and safe from the dangers of nuclear and radiological terrorism threats.

International laws on nuclear security are still at an early stage of formation and lack binding force in most cases. The only two international treaties on nuclear security with binding force are the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The CPPNM, which came into effect in February 1987, is the only legally binding international instrument dealing with physical protection of nuclear material and other radiological sources. It requires national legislation to prevent and punish nuclear material-related offenses. While the initial CPPNM only

covered international transportation of nuclear material, the 2005 Amendment called for the protection of nuclear material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport as well as at nuclear facilities. This new amendment also asks for states to respond quickly to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, to mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and to prevent and combat related offenses. Since the 2005 Amendment is not yet in effect, lacking ratification by the required two-thirds of member states, its early effectuation has become one of the primary goals of the Nuclear Security Summit.

The ICSANT, based on the draft first proposed by Russia in 1998, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signing in 2005. This is a key element of global efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. The convention provides for a definition of acts of nuclear terrorism, and covers a broad range of offenses including those against nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors. The ICSANT also obligates states to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders, and encourages them to share information and assist each other during criminal investigations and extradition proceedings.

The status of these two critical nuclear security conventions shows that international laws on nuclear security are still at an early stage of development, in comparison to the laws in other nuclear fields such as nonproliferation and nuclear safety. International cooperation in the nuclear security area is also slow and weak.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 were a wake-up call that alarmed the international community with the looming danger of nuclear terrorism and necessitated a quick reaction. Against this backdrop, promising new nuclear security measures were launched. However, a shortage of resources, high-level attention, international coordination, and global norms has limited their effects.

First, the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This resolution binds UN member states to stop supporting non-State actors seeking weapons of mass destruction, to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-State actors and their financing, and to enforce effective measures for nonproliferation. Though the UNSCR 1540 Committee was established to accelerate implementation of the Resolution, its mandates and resources have been insufficient to fulfill its goals of nonproliferation and nuclear security.

Second, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (the Global Partnership) was launched at the June 2002 Kananaskis G-8 Summit. A decade-long commitment, the Global Partnership pursues nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety issues through cooperative projects for the destruction and dismantlement of WMD, disposition of fissile materials, and retraining of former weapons scientists for new civilian jobs. The Global Partnership is an expansion of the US-led Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has been conducted in the former Soviet Union since 1992. In this regard, this US-led nuclear security endeavor evolved from the unilateral CTR program into the multilateral G-8 Global Partnership in 2002, and finally into the much larger Nuclear Security Summit in 2010.

Third, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), proposed and co-chaired by the US and Russia, was launched in 2006 to develop a partnership to combat nuclear terrorism. The GICNT is a voluntary cooperative framework that, as of 2011, has been joined by 82 members and four observers. Members have been asked on a “voluntary basis” to implement principles such as developing accounting, control, and physical protection systems for nuclear and radioactive materials; enhancing the security

of civilian nuclear facilities; improving detection capabilities to prevent the illicit trafficking of such materials; and supporting the IAEA's nuclear security functions.

Finally, the IAEA's nuclear security functions were expanded in order to adapt to a new international security environment after the 9/11 incident. First, the IAEA's Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225, which provides guidance and recommendations for developing and implementing the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, was revised for the fifth time in 2011 and published as INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5. Second, the IAEA also published the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013 and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series to provide guidelines for nuclear security. Finally, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was created to assist its member states in implementing various nuclear security instruments and guidelines.

Nevertheless, these new initiatives were all handicapped by incomplete and insufficient national legislation, lax implementation, and their voluntary nature. Bearing in the mind that the global nuclear security network is only as strong as its weakest link, world leaders responded positively to the call made by President Obama in his April 2009 speech in Prague to hold a nuclear security summit with the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years.⁶

2. The 2010 Washington Summit

The Washington Nuclear Security Summit was held on April 12-13, 2010 with leaders from 47 states and representatives from the UN, IAEA, and EU. At the summit, the leaders pledged to keep nuclear materials under control and away from the wrong hands; to continue to evaluate the threat and improve security as changing conditions may require; to exchange best practices and information; to support global nuclear security efforts; to ratify related treaties; and to provide security assistance as necessary.

The summit also adopted a Communiqué, the highest-level political statement for nuclear security, and a Work Plan, which offers guidance for national and international actions to carry out the pledges of the Communiqué and outlines specific steps that need to be taken to bring the vision of the Communiqué into reality.⁷ Finally, 27 countries made voluntary national commitments to support the summit through additional nuclear security actions.

While largely praised as a success, the Washington Summit reflects the current developmental stage of the global nuclear security regime and the unique nature of nuclear security.

First, global leaders at the summit shared the common perception of the threat of nuclear terrorism. During the working dinner held on April 12, 2010 to "evaluate the threat of nuclear terrorism," leaders agreed that it is a serious and immediate threat and that any state could be a target of nuclear terrorism. Despite this seemingly common understanding at the summit, the level and urgency of that threat perception still varies widely among states and regions.

Second, there are still no binding international security conventions or standards that ensure individual countries will adopt adequate levels of protection for nuclear material. The Washington Summit reflected these limitations. In order to reach a consensus, participants often had to be content with a low common denominator and voluntary measures. The emphasis on the so-called house gifts, voluntary state commitments, also reflected the limitations of the international nuclear security regime.

A third notable characteristic of the Washington Summit was the participation of nongovernmental

organizations and experts at parallel events. The summit recognized that the participation of experts, academia, industry, and nongovernmental organizations was an integral part of the global nuclear security regime.

3. The Decision to Hold the Second Summit in Korea

Immediately after the first session of the Washington Summit on April 13, 2010, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak held a press conference at which he announced that the Republic of Korea had been selected to host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. According to President Lee, Seoul was chosen during the first session of the summit when “President Obama proposed Seoul to be the host of the next summit and all other summits agreed by a consensus.”

Washington had begun exploring Seoul as a serious candidate for the host of the second summit in early April 2010, less than two weeks before the Washington Summit. Looking into the background of this decision, the Korean media reported that the first high-level consultation between the US and Korea took place on April 1, 2010, when President Obama called President Lee to discuss various security issues. During the conversation, President Obama also asked if Korea could host the next summit. President Lee responded positively, but not conclusively at the time.

Seoul finally decided to accept the US offer to host the second summit at the Sherpa Meeting on April 9, 2010, leaving a formal and final decision to the April 12-13 summit. It was then reported that at the first session of the summit President Obama announced, “President Lee Myung-bak agreed to host the 2012 Summit. I appreciate Korea’s decision to willingly host the next Summit that reflects its leadership in Asian and global affairs.” Russia was initially raised as a strong candidate to host the second summit, but in the consultation process, however, it decided not to accept the offer.

4. Significance and Goals of the 2012 Seoul Summit: A Korean Perspective

The Significance of the Seoul Summit

The ROK public and government welcomed President Obama’s decision to award the second summit to South Korea. Ambassador Kim Bong-hyeon, ROK Sherpa to the Seoul Summit, explains the significance of Korea’s role as the host and chair.⁸

First, serving as the host and chair of the Nuclear Security Summit is very meaningful in the post-Cold War era, in particular after the 9/11 attacks. South Korea has always been an active participant in various global efforts to forge a better and more peaceful world. Especially in this age of globalization, nuclear terrorism is a common challenge to the international community that requires responsible actions not only by the US and Western countries, but also by all members of the global community, including South Korea.⁹ Nuclear and radiological terrorism anywhere can become nuclear and radiological terrorism everywhere. The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is a significant work-in-progress, building on the ground work laid out during the 2010 summit intended to address that danger.

Second, the hosting of the second NSS will demonstrate the leading status of South Korea on the international stage. While there are many countries with deeper interests and influence in the nuclear security field, South Korea was chosen as host, in part in recognition of its excellent record in the fields of

nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, despite an ever-present North Korean nuclear threat. ROK leadership in global problem solving on such issues as climate change, economic crisis, and nuclear nonproliferation might have also played a part. Furthermore, Korea is also known for its bridging diplomacy as a middle power which contributes greatly to addressing global issues as was demonstrated at the 2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul.

Third, the Seoul Summit will address all major issues in the field of nuclear security, including responses to nuclear terrorism, the protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and the prevention of illicit nuclear trafficking. It is also expected to expand the scope of these discussions. For example, the security of radioactive sources, which had been set aside at the Washington Summit, will be reintroduced. The Fukushima nuclear accident showed that radiological terrorism may not only be more likely to occur than nuclear terrorism, but could also be just as disastrous.

Fourth, the Seoul Summit could have positive political implications for the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. There will be important political changes in the region in 2012: North Korea has claimed that it will build a “Strong and Prosperous State” armed with nuclear weapons; presidential elections will be held in the US, Russia, and South Korea, and a leadership transition will take place in China.¹⁰ During this time of change and uncertainty, the news that leaders of major countries will gather on the Korean peninsula to discuss international security and world peace will work positively for stabilizing the Korean peninsula and for denuclearizing North Korea. Though the North Korean nuclear issue is not a nuclear security issue and will not be on the summit agenda, the Korean public expects that the Seoul Summit will somehow help restart the denuclearization process.

In summary, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will be a valuable opportunity to enhance the status of South Korea on the international stage. There is little doubt that after successfully hosting the 2010 G-20 Summit, the premier forum for addressing international economic issues, it will do well in holding a successful Nuclear Security Summit as well.

Goals of the Seoul Summit

The ROK government envisions a world free from the threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The NSS process is a critical tool that enables world leaders to share not only their perceptions of a nuclear terrorism threat, but also their determination to fight it through various nuclear security measures.

In addition to the shared objectives of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), world leaders also agree that nuclear security is another shared objective.¹¹ Through the Seoul Summit, the ROK government aims to present both a practical vision and concrete measures to strengthen nuclear security. It also hopes for the summit to help restore confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which has significantly decreased since the Fukushima nuclear accident.

With these goals in mind, the ROK government has identified three key objectives for the Seoul Summit.¹² First, it will reaffirm and consolidate the political will that was generated at the Washington Summit. Second, it will further advance the implementation of the agreements made in Washington and to secure further commitments. Third, it will contribute to the realization of key nuclear security objectives through a Communiqué.

The government has also stipulated three principal agendas for the Seoul Summit to build a world free from the threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism and to move “Beyond Security Toward Peace.”¹³

First, the Seoul Summit will seek cooperative measures to fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism. These include measures to reinforce international cooperation for the safe and secure management of weapons-grade nuclear materials and to thwart illegal trafficking and smuggling.

Second, it will seek ways to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and related facilities. World leaders will aim to reach an agreement on concrete actions to better secure nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, nuclear reactors, and other nuclear facilities. Drawing upon the recent Fukushima accident, the potential nuclear safety implications for nuclear security will also be examined.

Third, it will seek ways to prevent radiological materials from falling into the wrong hands. While the magnitude of the damage of explosive or dispersal devices using radiological materials, or “dirty bombs,” may be smaller than that of nuclear terrorism, the likelihood of its occurrence may be higher as it is easier to acquire such material and to assemble dirty bombs. Participating leaders will take these issues into account and discuss measures to address this threat of radiological terrorism.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT AND PARALLEL CONFERENCES

1. Seoul Summit Preparations

The Summit Preparatory Committee and Secretariat

The ROK government officially started preparing for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Summit in October 2010 by establishing a preparatory committee chaired by the Prime minister. This is a non-standing, high-level, intergovernmental committee whose members include ministers of all related government agencies, the heads of related nongovernmental organizations, and civilian experts. The committee performs such functions as planning, coordination, and evaluation of the summit preparations.

Serious mid-level government preparations started in March 2011 with the establishment of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat which is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Secretariat, which opened its office in May 2011, is endowed with tasks for all administrative work and implementation of Summit preparations, protocols, and domestic and international promotion.

In order to make the Seoul Summit a successful diplomatic event, the Secretariat is planning to utilize all available resources, including convention management professionals, and promotion and public relations companies, along with many volunteers. US experiences from hosting the 2010 Summit were also passed along to the Secretariat and taken into consideration. A successful hosting of the 2010 G-20 Summit has served as a guide for the ROK government in organizing this even bigger summit with more than 50 participating states and international organizations.

While promoting the Seoul Summit, the ROK government has experienced difficulties in attracting attention and support from its people. Those who are interested often do not understand the narrow scope of the NSS process. As they live under a daily North Korean nuclear threat, the South Korean public expects the Seoul Summit to address that danger as well. They also believe that nuclear safety, another palpable and realistic nuclear issue since the Fukushima accident, should be discussed.¹⁴

Low interest from the general public is not unusual, however. In the US, the Washington Summit drew little attention from the public and media as well and was perceived as an event mainly for diplomats and experts. To most people, not just in these host states, but elsewhere in the world, nuclear security is a new and difficult issue to comprehend. It is also perceived to be less urgent than the continuing economic and financial turmoil in many countries, and the upcoming leadership changes in several countries this year will inevitably distract the public's attention further away from nuclear security.

In order to gain greater public support for the Seoul Summit and its nuclear security goals, the ROK government and the participating states and international organizations should make more concerted efforts through national and international outreach activities. The ROK government has already conducted such activities, and will expand these efforts as the summit gets closer. The two pre-summit events, the Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium and the Nuclear Industry Summit, will also help attract more public and expert attention.

Participating States and International Organizations

The 2010 Washington Summit was attended by leaders from 47 states and 3 international organizations. According to the US government, the criteria for being invited to the first summit included possession of nuclear material, regional distribution, current and planned nuclear energy programs, support for the cause of the summit, and extra national commitments.

While the initial round of invitations was only extended to a small number of states, this number increased during the summit preparation process.¹⁵ The US had initially only planned to invite about 20 states—those with stockpiles of nuclear materials and large nuclear energy programs. By the first Sherpa Meeting in Vienna in September 2009, however, the number of attendees had already grown to 37 states and 3 international organizations. This continued to increase, resulting in 47 states attending the summit itself.

The number of participating states and international organizations remained the same after the Washington Summit and throughout the 2011 Sherpa Meetings, with only the addition of INTERPOL. However, as new states expressed a strong interest in participating in the Seoul Summit, this number has increased as well. The ROK government, as the summit host and chair, holds a positive view of having more states participating as long as they support and contribute to the strengthening of the international nuclear security regime in a meaningful way.

The absence of North Korea and Iran at the Washington Summit drew unusual media attention. Even though these two states possess nuclear material, they were excluded from the summit because of the challenges they pose to the global nonproliferation and nuclear security regimes as well as their controversial nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, if Iran and North Korea had attended the summit, the meeting could have turned into another round of the NPT Review Conference or an expanded Six Party Talks scenario. The US did not want any diversion of the summit's sole focus on nuclear terrorism and nuclear security to issues that could be better handled in other existing nuclear fora.

Participating States and International Organizations of the Seoul Summit (as of 2011.12)¹⁶

Region, IOs	States (47), International Organizations (4)
Asia (12)	Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Japan, People's Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines
The Americas (6)	Mexico, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada
Oceania (2)	New Zealand, Australia
Europe (18)	the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Russian Federation, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Armenia, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy, Georgia, Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, France, Finland
Middle East (7)	Morocco, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Jordan, Israel, Egypt
Africa (2)	Nigeria, South Africa
International Organizations (4)	United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, European Union, INTERPOL

South Korea, however, had a different view about how to handle the issue of North Korea. President Lee Myung-bak repeatedly invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the summit on the condition that Pyongyang shows a firm commitment to denuclearize. There was little possibility that Kim would come to Seoul, considering that he had refused to visit even in much more favorable political conditions during the Sunshine Policy period under previous administrations. In addition, he had never attended any multilateral summits. With Kim Jong Il's unexpected death in late December 2011, controversies over the proposed invitation have ended.

International Advisory Group: Eminent Persons Group

In November 2011, the ROK Government established a 15-member presidential advisory group, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), to advise President Lee Myung-bak on the Seoul Summit. The government also wanted these prominent figures to help promote the meeting nationally and internationally, because the summit had been receiving less public and media attention than expected. Seoul also expects to have an opportunity to raise related nuclear issues such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and the North Korean nuclear issue at informal settings like advisory meetings or other pre-summit conferences in order to meet the demands from the public and the media.

The EPG includes well-known statesmen, diplomats, and scholars such as former Indian President Abdul Kalam, former Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, former Secretary-General of the IAEA Hans Blix, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger, former US Defense Secretary William Perry, former US Senator Sam Nunn, Harvard University Professor Graham Allison, ROK Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Chairman Kang Chang-sun, and former ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-joo, among others.

The first EPG meeting was held in Seoul on November 29 at the invitation of President Lee. At this advisory meeting, the EPG members advised President Lee on nuclear security issues, expressed their support for the Seoul Summit, and offered ideas on how to make it a success. Later that day, the EPG adopted the six-point Joint Statement as follows.

1. The Seoul Summit should demonstrate tangible progress in implementing the commitments made at the Washington Summit and report that progress. It should propose a practical vision and new

concrete measures in the Seoul Communiqué.

2. Participating states should make significant contributions to the objective of strengthening the nuclear security regime with voluntary commitments and affirm the essential role of the IAEA.
3. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Seoul Summit should look for ways to strengthen both nuclear safety and security, to prevent radiological terrorism, and to strengthen international and regional cooperation mechanisms.
4. It should prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear materials by sharing information and best practices and by enhancing national nuclear security capacities.
5. It should support efforts to hold a third summit to provide a political impetus for the nuclear security regime strengthening process and to assess President Obama's four-year nuclear material security goal.¹⁷

In addition, the EPG recognized that the summit would serve as a “catalyst for realizing a world free of nuclear and radiological terrorism” by both reaffirming the principles and the spirit of the Washington Summit and reaching agreement on new commitments and measures to enhance nuclear security.

The EPG also expressed its position on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radiological security issues in the post-Fukushima era. First, it expected that leaders at the summit should enhance public confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Second, it urged leaders to make efforts to reduce the threats to nuclear facilities and their operating systems by discussing the ways in which nuclear security and nuclear safety can be mutually reinforced, bearing in mind the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. Third, it recognized that there is a critical need to build up national and regional capabilities to deal with the aftermath of a radiological and nuclear accident, regardless of its causes, in order to mitigate the consequences. Fourth, noting the possibility and consequences of radiological terrorism, it suggested that the summit should seriously deal with the issue of radiological security.

2. Two Parallel Events: Symposium and Industry Summit

Following the precedent of the Washington Summit, two nongovernmental pre-summit conferences will be held. The Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium and Nuclear Industry Summit will both be held on March 23, 2012 at different locations in Seoul. The Symposium will be a meeting of nuclear security experts from nongovernmental organizations, academia, and media, while the Industry Summit will be a gathering of experts from nuclear industry and business.

These two events are meant to symbolize support for the goals of the NSS process by civil society, academia, and industry on a global scale. They also symbolize states' recognition of the roles and contributions of civil society, academia, and industry in the global effort to fight nuclear terrorism.

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium to be held on March 23, 2012, will be co-sponsored by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS).¹⁸

The Symposium organizers plan to invite around 150 foreign participants, including civilian and governmental experts from about 50 participating states and four international organizations. In addition to national and geographical representations, the organizers also plan to invite nuclear security experts

from around the world, as well as members and international partners of the Fissile Material Working Group, the Washington-based organizer of the nongovernmental nuclear security conference held in conjunction with the 2010 Washington Summit.¹⁹

While programming the Symposium, the organizers intend to achieve the following goals. First, the Symposium will attempt to present a vision of global nuclear security governance and a roadmap for the future. While struggling to fight nuclear and radiological terrorism today, there is a need to look ahead and prepare for the evolving nuclear terrorism threats of the future. Agreement on the vision of a future nuclear security framework could lead to agreement on what we should do now to help achieve that vision. Second, the Symposium will be a place for NGOs, individuals, and media to network with each other and create a stronger global effort going forward. Third, the Symposium can help build a private-individual-state-international partnership against nuclear terrorism. Finally, the Symposium will provide participants with the best opportunity to share information, values, and visions on nuclear security.

The Symposium, subtitled, “Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance,” will focus on four groups of issues: nuclear terrorism threats and nuclear security status, key challenges and solutions, the interface between nuclear safety and security, and future global nuclear security governance. In particular, the Symposium intends to add to the usual mix of topics a special emphasis on “global nuclear security governance.”

While conventional approaches tend to focus on states and formal treaties, the global governance approach recognizes the values of both diversified forms of international norms and multiple actors. This inclusive and holistic approach provides a new perspective in dealing with such complicated issues as nuclear terrorism in this globalized, networked, and complex world.

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit, an industry and business pre-summit event, will also be held on March 23, 2012. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation (KHNP), host of the Industry Summit, plans to bring in over 200 Korean and foreign participants including CEOs from the world’s leading nuclear enterprises and delegates from international organizations.

The Industry Summit, subtitled, “The Role of the Nuclear Industry in Enhancing Nuclear Security and Safety,” will discuss the importance of the integrative approach to nuclear security and safety as well as the role of the private sector in nuclear security. In order to prepare for substantive discussions and results, KHNP established an international advisory committee for the planning and programming of this event. It established three working groups on the minimization of civilian use of HEU, the security of sensitive information, and the nexus between nuclear security and safety after Fukushima. These groups, comprised of experts from major nuclear corporations, will hold a series of seminars beforehand to produce a summary communiqué that will be presented to and adopted at the Industry Summit.

According to KHNP, the summary report of the Industry Summit, or communiqué, will call for more specific nuclear security actions, greater responsibility on nuclear security and safety integration, and enhanced international cooperation by the industry.

DRAFTING THE SEOUL COMMUNIQUÉ

1. Governmental Negotiations

A Two-Stage Negotiation Process

Participating states held a series of negotiations to select the agenda items of the Seoul Summit and to draft the Seoul Communiqué. The drafting process proceeded in two stages. During the first stage, participating states held preliminary negotiations to look into nuclear security issues for further study and improvements coming out of the Washington Communiqué, while also looking for additional agenda items for the Seoul Summit. This stage included the first two Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings: the Buenos Aires Sherpa Meeting in November 2011 and the Vienna Sous-Sherpa Meeting in March 2011.

The second stage started with the Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011 when participating states began deliberating on a draft Communiqué that had been proposed by Seoul based on discussions held at the two previous Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings. The ROK government, as summit host and chair, was obligated to draft the Seoul Communiqué in consultation with all participating states.

During the second stage, there were three Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings: the Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011, the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting in October 2011, and the Delhi Sherpa Meeting in January 2012. Since the draft Seoul Communiqué, even after the Delhi Sherpa Meeting, still contains a few paragraphs with different positions, there will be one more Sherpa Meeting in Seoul on March 23, 2012 to complete the draft. However, it is also likely that the draft Communiqué will be completed through various bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels even before the final Seoul Sherpa Meeting. The second stage drafting process, starting from the Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011, is described below.

Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011

The Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting was held on June 27-28, 2011, with representatives from 47 participating states and four international organizations—UN, IAEA, EU, and INTERPOL (INTERPOL is a new addition to the summit process). This Sous-Sherpa Meeting was arranged to take place in Seoul right before the 2011 General Conference of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Daejeon a few days after the Sous-Sherpa Meeting so that foreign delegations could attend both meetings. The ROK Foreign Minister, Kim Sung-hwan, emphasized during his welcoming remarks that Korea, as the chair of the Seoul Summit, would make best efforts to ensure that the “Summit will lay out practical visions and concrete action plans on nuclear security, thereby contributing to freeing the world from nuclear and radiation threats.”

Throughout the Sous-Sherpa Meeting, delegations discussed and negotiated the draft Seoul Communiqué that the government had prepared. The meeting reaffirmed the basic goals and principles on nuclear security that were agreed to during the Washington Summit. There were also discussions on additional nuclear security measures to protect radioactive material and nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material; to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; and to reinforce the international nuclear security framework.

In the wake of the disastrous nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, delegations also discussed the implications of nuclear safety issues for nuclear security. The Fukushima nuclear accident revived discussions of the radiological security issue that had been set aside at the Washington

Summit. Overall, based on these talks, Seoul was better prepared to improve the format and agenda of the Seoul Communiqué.

The Helsinki Sherpa Meeting in October 2011

The next Sherpa Meeting was held on October 4-5, 2011 in Helsinki, Finland. Again delegations from 47 participating states and four international organizations attended the session. Following the presiding arrangements made at the first Buenos Aires Sherpa Meeting in 2010, Kim Bong-hyun, ROK Sherpa and Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs, and Gary Samore, US Sherpa and the White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, co-chaired the meeting.

The Helsinki Sherpa Meeting made significant progress in shaping the draft Seoul Communiqué in terms of format and agenda. In order to continue focused debate and negotiation, the Sherpas agreed to adopt five principles for drafting the Communiqué as proposed by the ROK Sherpa: 1) to place nuclear security at the center of the discussion; 2) to ensure continuity with the Washington Nuclear Security Summit while at the same time making new progress; 3) to confirm the voluntary nature of national commitments and participation; 4) to not create a new nuclear security regime; and 5) to respect President Obama's vision to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years.

The Sherpas also agreed to focus their dialogue on the following nuclear security issues: securing high-risk materials such as highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium; enhancing the protection of nuclear facilities; creating synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety; preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; tightening the management of radioactive materials for dirty bombs; encouraging states to join and ratify the ICSANT and the CPPNM; bolstering the global nuclear security architecture such as the GICNT, G-8 Global Partnership, and the UNSC 1540 Committee; and strengthening the IAEA's nuclear security activities.²⁰

There was also a serious debate regarding the inclusion into the Seoul Communiqué of two new issues—radiological security and the nuclear security and safety interface. On the latter, the Sherpas discussed the issue of nuclear safety from the perspective of nuclear security in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. Despite some reservation and opposition to expand the scope of the agenda beyond the Washington Communiqué, a new consensus emerged that these two issues should be included on the Summit agenda while focus on nuclear security is maintained.

Finally the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting succeeded in narrowing differences in views among participating countries regarding the structure, direction, and contents of the Seoul Communiqué.

2. Principles for Drafting the Communiqué

Though earlier governmental negotiations until mid-2011 were somewhat ambitious in their goals for the Seoul Summit, the limits of multilateral diplomacy working under the principle of consensus were soon realized.

Since the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan were very comprehensive, it was difficult for any following agreements to go further beyond them. Some countries have wanted to stick strictly to a narrowly defined scope of “nuclear security,” warning that any additional issues would “dilute” the key objective of the nuclear security summit to prevent “nuclear terrorism.” Others have refused to take

on additional responsibilities and the burden of stronger and expanded nuclear security measures that potentially go beyond the current regime and the “sovereignty principle” of nuclear security.

Therefore, discussions at the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting addressed what should be included in the Seoul Communiqué—what expectations could be set for participating states that would still ensure its adoption at the Summit. This resulted in five guiding principles.

1. Nuclear security remains the main focus of the summit.
2. The Communiqué should maintain continuity with the first summit while demonstrating progress. Since continuation does not mean simple repetition, however, the countries also agreed that the Seoul Communiqué should reflect elements of progress in its text as well.
3. The participation of States and their commitments made in the process of the Nuclear Security Summit is voluntary.
4. The Nuclear Security Summit does not intend to create a new regime.
5. Participating countries respect the four-year vision of President Obama as announced in his 2009 Prague speech.²¹

These five principles were to reconfirm basic objectives of the summit. They were also necessary to accelerate the Communiqué negotiation process since some states were not ready to accept any additional nuclear security measures beyond those established during the Washington Summit and those of the current international nuclear security regime.

3. Communiqué Agenda

The first Sherpa meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina in early November 2010 agreed to focus its discussion on nine issues from the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan that required additional study. Nine participating states volunteered to each look into one of these issues, and presented on their findings and policy suggestions at the Vienna meeting held March 21-24, 2011.²²

These nine topics included: information security, HEU guidelines, transportation security, illicit trafficking prevention, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, radioactive sources, treaty ratification, and international coordination and cooperation.

Since the November 2010 Buenos Aires Sherpa meeting, it was widely conjectured among experts that these nine topics would also become the agenda items for the 2012 Seoul Summit and Communiqué. When delegations met for the Sous-Sherpa meeting in March 2011 in Vienna, they began discussing these topics based on working papers and presentations by the volunteer countries. In fact, these nine topics were not meant to be agenda items, but important issues that needed further study.

After the Vienna meeting, South Korea took the initiative of drafting a Seoul Communiqué text before the June 2011 Seoul Sous-Sherpa meeting. Since then, there have been three rounds of Communiqué text negotiations, including the Seoul Sous-Sherpa meeting in June 2010, the Helsinki Sherpa meeting in October 2011, and the Delhi Sherpa meeting in January 2012. There may also be one more Sherpa meeting in Seoul just days before the summit to finalize the Communiqué text and to check various event arrangements.

A South Korean representative indicated that the Seoul Communiqué will be one document without a separate Work Plan, and that its format and length will be somewhere between that of the Washington

Communiqué and the Work Plan. He also indicated that the Seoul Communiqué would include the following issues and topics, among others.

1. Coordination of the Global Nuclear Security Architecture
2. Role of the IAEA
3. Management of Nuclear Materials
4. Transportation Security and Illicit Trafficking Prevention
5. Information Security
6. Nuclear Forensics
7. Nuclear Security Culture
8. International Cooperation
9. Radiological Security
10. Synergy/Nexus between Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safety²³

All of these topics originated with the Washington agreements except two: radiological security and the synergy/nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety. The Washington Summit focused on nuclear material and nuclear security to prevent and deter “nuclear terrorism.”

Why did participating states agree to include these two additional items on the agenda? Their inclusion would have been impossible without the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011. Traditionally, nuclear terrorism is considered a low probability, but high consequence case, while radiological terrorism is a high probability, but low consequence one. After the Fukushima accident, “Fukushima-like radiological terrorism” became a high probability and high consequence case. These two issues are discussed below.

Radiological Security

One of the best ways to raise the profile and awareness of radiological material security is to bring this issue to the attention of state leaders. The inclusion of radiological source security on the Seoul Summit agenda and in the Communiqué sets this summit apart from the Washington Summit, which had been primarily to lock down, consolidate, and secure weapon-usable fissile material, including HEU and separated plutonium, to prevent nuclear terrorism.

During the Washington Summit process, there had been debate about the scope of nuclear material security: whether or not radiological sources should be included. However, the US wanted to keep a narrow focus on nuclear terrorism and nuclear material. The US claimed that nuclear terrorism is a low probability, but very high consequence case, while radiological terrorism is a high probability, low consequence one. Therefore the Washington Summit was all about security of HEU and separated plutonium, except one passing phrase at the end of the Communiqué: “[We] Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to security these material as well.”

While preparing for the 2012 Seoul Summit, the debate over the inclusion of radiological security returned. In the meantime, an unusual nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, caused by a great tsunami occurred. This accident raised serious concerns that nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to targeted terrorist and criminal attacks and the radiological consequences could be extremely damaging. Currently the Japanese government imposes a 20 km radius off-the-limit evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Chernobyl maintains a 30 km radius exclusion zone. What would happen if there were a radiological terrorism attack in a metropolitan city, and a 20 or 30 km radius

exclusion zone were imposed indefinitely?

After the Fukushima nuclear accident, the world has to deal with both “9/11 nuclear terrorism” and “Fukushima radiological terrorism” with similar priority. For most countries without fissile material, radiological terrorism appears to have an even higher priority.

It is expected that the Seoul Summit will address the importance of radiological security as well as the effective and secure management of radiological sources, while maintaining a primary focus on nuclear material security. Radiological sources—more widely used and dispersed—could be more vulnerable to malign acts. Stronger radiological security would enable a wider, safer and more beneficial use of this material for medical, agricultural, industrial, and research purposes.

Synergy/Nexus between Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safety

The nexus between nuclear security and safety has also come to our attention since the Fukushima nuclear accident and will be addressed at the Seoul Summit. Even before the Fukushima accident, there were efforts to strengthen the interface between nuclear security and safety. The IAEA has been looking for ways to integrate its nuclear safety and security functions for some time. Its International Nuclear Safety Group published a report titled, “The Interface between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” in 2010. Concluding that “the security regime at nuclear power plants is far less developed than the safety regime,” the report asks for joint management of these two traditionally disparate functions through close communication, consultation, and coordination.

When these two functions are complementary, the joint management system can reinforce each other. When these two are conflicting, as in principles of confidentiality vs. transparency or the primary role of the state vs. society/industry, a joint management system still could reduce confusion and help find optimal solutions.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also took an initiative of emphasizing the integration of nuclear safety and security. While stating that “nuclear accidents respect no borders” at the Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy on April 19, 2011, remembering the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Secretary-General Ban emphatically proposed to “build a stronger connection between nuclear safety and security” as one of five steps to enhance nuclear safety.”²⁴

Following a rising demand to strengthen both nuclear security and safety, the Seoul Summit is expected to discuss the issue of complementary relations and synergies between the two. Now there is a general consensus that, regardless of different causes of nuclear security and safety accidents, their consequences will damage humans and environments in a same way. Therefore we need to build effective disaster/emergency response and mitigation capabilities to cope with both cases of nuclear safety and security contingencies, once they occur. In addition, we need to design and manage facilities so that both nuclear safety and security concerns are dealt with in a coherent and complementary manner.

Once the Seoul Summit agrees on the importance of an integrated approach to nuclear security and safety and its synergy effect, there will be more concerted efforts by the IAEA, states, nuclear power plant operators, and other NGOs to find the best regulations, legislation, and practices to that effect.

EPILOGUE

On December 17, 2011, approximately three months before the 2012 Seoul Summit, the ROK Government issued a press release reporting that the summit preparations are well underway.

The government and its preparatory Secretariat for the summit are carrying forward its close consultation with governments of some 50 participating states regarding the agenda of the summit, while promoting the summit at home and conducting active public diplomacy activities for major participating countries. Consultation on the “Seoul Communiqué,” which will be adopted as the outcome document of the Seoul Summit, is currently well underway and is expected to be completed before the summit commences.

As the chair of the summit, South Korea has conducted active public diplomacy activities for major participating countries. ROK diplomatic missions abroad have held briefings and seminars on the summit for foreign government officials, diplomatic corps, research institutions, colleges, and journalists to expand the international community’s support for the summit and enhance the ROK’s global stature and image.²⁵

Assuming that the Seoul Summit will be successful, people have begun to raise questions about the future of the NSS process beyond the upcoming meeting. What is certain is that there will be the third summit in 2014 in the Netherlands. That session will have the specific goal, among others, of evaluating whether President Obama’s four-year objective of securing fissile material has been achieved.

Can we expect another summit after 2014? Though no one can give a definite answer, most agree that a fourth summit will not take place in the current format with a nuclear security focus. Nuclear security is too specific, technical, and narrow for state leaders to continue regular discussions. If there is a fourth summit, it could be a nuclear summit dealing with all aspects of nuclear issues at the highest political level. One thing for sure is that there will be a growing consensus that the momentum gained through the vision of a nuclear-weapons free world and the NSS process should somehow be maintained and remembered. For example, there could be a lower-level nuclear security forum or process like the GICNT or a commemorating conference.

The Nuclear Security Symposium plans to look for answers to this question by discussing a ten-year nuclear security plan or a nuclear security vision, which will go beyond the current four-year plan. As nuclear and radiological terrorism threats evolve, so should the nuclear security regime. In the third summit in 2014, it is expected that a serious discussion on the future of the summits as well as of the global nuclear security regime will take place.

Finally, there is the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, which is presently the most urgent and challenging nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. We know that the North Korea nuclear issue will not be on the summit agenda, despite the wishes of the South Korean public. However, the public should understand that the summit is not about preventing nuclear proliferation by state actors, but about fighting nuclear terrorism by non-state actors. They should also understand that it is not about finger-pointing and blaming specific states like North Korea, but about building a consensus among all the participating countries on strengthening the nuclear security regime. Nonetheless, the South Korean public will still expect the world’s leader to note the danger of the North Korean nuclear program and to raise the urgent need for denuclearization during the Seoul Summit or at least on its sidelines.

(Endnotes)

- 1 The vision originates from Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008.
- 2 More specifically, in order to achieve his nuclear security goals, President Obama proposed to set new standards, expand cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down sensitive nuclear materials, break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade, turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions.
- 3 "Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2011, <http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdf>.
- 4 Illicit Trafficking Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp>.
- 5 For a brief explanation of each element of the international nuclear security regime, see "Nuclear Security Work Plan Reference Document," an appendix to the 2010 Washington Communiqué and Work Plan, The White House, April 13, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/nuclear-security-work-plan-reference-document>.
- 6 "Remarks by President Barack Obama," Embassy of the United States, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, <http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html>.
- 7 For a brief summary of the Washington Summit, see "Key Facts about the Nuclear Security Summit," The White House, April 12, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-nuclear-security-summit>.
- 8 Bong-hyeon Kim, "The Significance of Hosting the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit," *Korea Policy*, (Korea Policy Research Center, 2011).
- 9 Korea has especially high stakes in the world peace and stable trade environment since its foreign trade dependence index/ratio, the total amount of import and export divided by the gross domestic production, reaches up to 110% in 2011, the highest one in the world. For example, the ratios for the US and Japan are around 25%, China 50%, and Germany 76%. Korea is also a special beneficiary of a globalized world, since its fast economic growth owes to import and export greatly. This also means that if the global trade environment is disrupted due to, for example, nuclear and radiological terrorism, the South Korean economy will be one of the most badly damaged.
- 10 The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011 further heightened the level of uncertainty about the future of the Korean peninsula.
- 11 "Nuclear security" was once said to constitute a new and "fourth pillar" of the NPT. Most Non-Aligned Movement states oppose such a characterization, however, claiming that the NPT is complete and balanced with the original three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Now nuclear security is more commonly said to constitute a basis to the three pillars of the NPT, in the sense that these three pillars will be better achieved through a stronger nuclear security.
- 12 "2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit," Official Brochure of the Korean Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Committee, 2011.
- 13 "Beyond Security Toward Peace" is an official subtitle of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.
- 14 According to a poll conducted in South Korea in mid-2011, 36% of the Korean public answered that the North Korean nuclear issue should be a key agenda of the Seoul Summit, 21% nonproliferation issues, 15% nuclear safety, and only 10% nuclear security. Jung-yeop Woo, "Public Understanding of Nuclear Security Summit," *Korea Herald*, September 8, 2011.
- 15 Originally, President Obama proposed to hold a "Global Summit on Nuclear Security" in his April 2009 Prague speech. It was said that during the planning stage, the term "global" has been dropped since the summit would only be attended by selectively invited states.
- 16 In late February 2012, the ROK government announced that an additional six states had confirmed their participation in the Seoul Summit: Denmark, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Hungary and Romania from Europe and Gabon from Africa.
- 17 "Joint Statement of the Eminent Persons Group for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit," November 29, 2011, http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/eng_media/press/.
- 18 KINAC, a government-affiliated organization based in Daejeon, performs both research and regulatory functions on nuclear security, safeguards, and nuclear export control. IFANS, a Foreign Ministry-affiliated think tank based in Seoul, performs research and training functions.
- 19 The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) is a nongovernmental coalition of over 40 US experts representing many of the top nonproliferation and nuclear security organizations in the country and also includes

several international partner organizations, <http://www.fissilematerialsworkinggroup.org/>.

20 “Outcome of the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” October 6, 2011, <http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/>.

21 Bong-hyun Kim, Keynote Speech to the IFANS-Korea University International Conference on Nuclear Security, Safety and Technology at Korea University, October 28, 2011.

22 For a brief discussion and introduction of each of these nine topics, see Miles A. Pomper and Michelle E. Dover, “The Seoul Nuclear Summit,” *The National Interest*, JAN-FEB 2012 (January 4, 2012).

23 Bong-hyun Kim, Keynote Speech, and Choong-hee Hahn, “2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” presented at the IFANS-Korea University International Conference on Nuclear Security, Safety and Technology, Korea University, October 28, 2011.

24 “Secretary-General’s Remarks at Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy,” Kiev, Ukraine, April 19, 2011, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5209>.

25 http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/eng_main/main.jsp.



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