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South Korea's Emerging Leadership as a Partner in African Development

By Alice Guilford

I. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Korea is the first and only former aid-receiving country to have emerged as an aid donor. In 1961, Korea was a former Japanese colony torn apart by a destructive war, with an annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of only $82, putting it on par with the poorest African countries. From these humble beginnings, Korea experienced unprecedented economic growth over the next four decades, which eventually enabled it to join the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, with an annual per capita GDP of $12,732. In 1987, Korea also managed a peaceful political transition and has since consolidated into a liberal democracy. Today, Korea has become the eleventh-largest economy in the world, with an annual per capita GDP of $30,000 in 2010. Korea's economic development challenged widely held beliefs within development theory and caused the international community to reconsider its approach to assisting developing countries throughout the world. This experience makes Korea uniquely qualified as an emerging aid donor to offer development advice to developing countries and take on a leadership role in determining international development policy.

Nowhere is more in need of fresh approaches to sustainable development than Africa. Of the 53 countries on the continent, 33 are considered Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations, and half of all Africans live on less than $1.25 a day. Since the end of European colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s, African countries have experienced many challenges to their development, including corruption, poor governance, low productivity, and external and internal conflicts. Recent trends show a more optimistic future, but there is still a long way to go.

Africa has been the subject of multiple developmental initiatives. Western countries have traditionally led these efforts and have historically tied aid to conditions that were not always designed with the welfare of the recipient country's citizens in mind, sometimes rendering this type of aid unpopular. Throughout the Cold War, aid was tied to political loyalties, while the civil and human rights of the recipient populations were too often overlooked. Beginning in the 1980s, loans from international financial institutions (IFIs) were conditioned on the implementation of structural adjustment policies that required fiscal austerity and deregulation, compounding existing social problems. More recently, aid has been conditioned on efforts to encourage democracy and good governance.

In the new millennium, however, the emergence of new economic partners, led by China, has begun to seriously challenge European and American dominance in Africa. According to the United Nations' *African Economic Outlook 2011*, 38.5 percent of all trade with emerging partners in 2009 was with China, which totaled over $120 billion. China has also increased its foreign-aid budget to Africa and has built much-needed infrastructure, primarily to support its own economic projects. The Chinese model is not tied to preconditions and, because of this, it has been criticized for sustaining the rule of authoritarian regimes by creating new rents that directly fund these regimes and remove incentives for reform. The Chinese also tend to provide their own capital and labor within a recipient country, and by doing so the elite minority benefits at the expense of the majority.

A new approach to development is needed that allows for equal, mutually beneficial partnerships that encourage sustainable economic as well political and social development. Korea can offer such a new alternative that supports social and political change, without following the top-down donor-beneficiary model that has created distrust among many Africans of foreign development initiatives. Korea's own development experience and emerging leadership in the development community present a third model for economic development in Africa: Korea can apply the most relevant aspects of its own experience to the individual circumstances of specific countries.

To better understand Korea's experience, how this has shaped its emerging role, and how this can be translated to Africa requires a closer look at both Korea and Africa. The first section of this paper examines Korea's development experience. This is important because it helps to separate out the domestic and international factors that made Korea's success possible and also to explore what parts of Korea's path might be relevant for African countries, many of which experience the same constraints that Korea overcame. The second section looks at Africa's development history. African countries' troubled political and economic history has contributed to their relative underdevelopment. They have also received considerable attention from the Western development community and, more recently, from emerging markets, led by China. Both of these models have shortcomings, suggesting a need for a different approach to development. The last section investigates how Korea is emerging to fill this need by offering its expertise and aid. Although as yet this represents a small percentage of assistance to Africa, Korea's investment in this form of cooperation is growing quickly and has been eagerly received by its African partners. Korea's emerging leadership role in the international development community is evidenced by Korea's admission to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee in 2009, the G-20's signing of the Seoul Consensus at the summit Korea hosted one year later, and the country's high-profile role as host of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in December 2011.

II. KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Korea's economic development over the past fifty years has prompted debate over the causes of development, as academics have tried to determine the most significant contributors to Korea's rise and developing countries have tried to emulate it. Korea's success is often called a miracle, suggesting that the country's transition was an anomaly that would be difficult to replicate rather than the result of carefully planned policy interventions.

Korea's Growth Strategy

In 1961, six years after the Korean War ended in the division of the two Koreas along the thirty-eighth parallel, the Republic of Korea was still struggling to rebuild the two-thirds of its infrastructure destroyed in the war. Korea's annual per capita GDP was just $82. This placed the country in the bottom quintile worldwide, at the same level as Ghana and far behind Senegal and Mozambique. That year, President Park Chung-hee came to power in a military coup. The following year, he implemented the first of his five-year economic development plans.

Over the next three decades, the developing state closely monitored and directed economic growth. The government distinguished priority sectors and harnessed an exclusive, but highly competitive, core of elite businesses to carry out large-scale manufacturing and export-led growth. Korea's five-year plans focused on long-term management of industrialization, constant government reinvestment in the most successful industries, carefully controlled access to credit and funding, and industries that constantly adjusted to compete with global private-sector best practices. As a result, Korea's economy grew rapidly at a rate of 6.8 percent per year, increasing annual per capita GDP fivefold by 1987. Economic liberalization followed the 1987 transition to democracy and led in part to a financial crisis in 1997–98, briefly bringing Korea's economic future into question. Pragmatic reforms in the wake of the crisis, however, led once again to high growth rates. Today, Korea is the eleventh-largest economy in the world with an annual per capita GDP of $30,000.

In the initial stages of Korea's economic development, outside observers and Korea's own citizens were pessimistic about Korea's economic future. Like Africa today, Korea did not seem to have the prerequisites for development. The population was poor and internally displaced, there was no strong middle class, there were no established markets, and the economic development it had experienced was as a colony of Japan. The authoritarian regime was seen as an obstacle that had to be overcome, because it was widely understood that government intervention only hindered the more efficient workings of the market.

The Roles of Foreign Aid and Democratic Transition

It is often overlooked that Korea received considerable foreign aid that played a vital role throughout the years of its reconstruction and the first decades of the country's development. Major international donors included the UN Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). According to the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which oversees Korea's international development policy today, the supply of basic commodities such as food, clothing, medicine, and raw materials sustained many Koreans in the years following the war. Foreign budgetary assistance also enabled the Korean government to meet its expenditure obligations. Between 1953 and 1969, foreign aid accounted for 70 percent of Korea's imports and three-quarters of its capital formation. In the years following, foreign assistance continued to be an important source of government-directed capital and investment. By comparison, the World Bank reports that in 2010, mean official direct assistance (ODA) as a percentage of gross national input (GNI) to countries in sub-Saharan Africa was 4.9 percent. Few countries begin to approach Korea's early percentages of aid dependence.

Korea's successful transition from a highly repressive authoritarian regime to a consolidated liberal democracy proved equally important to its economic success. In 1987, President Roh Tae-woo was pressured to agree to extensive democratic reforms by society-wide protests. During the resulting elections, Roh decided to run for president and won with the help of a liberal coalition. He did not protest the one-term limit placed on the presidency and stepped down at the end of his term in 1992.

With the election of the Grand National Party's Lee Myung-bak in 2008, Korea passed Samuel Huntington's two-turnover test of a consolidated democracy. According to his theory, laid out in 1991 in his book *The Third Wave*, a democracy is on sound footing and can therefore be considered consolidated when its democratic institutions are strong enough to pass power between opposing political parties twice, through an electoral system. Though rising inequality, delayed private-sector reforms, and weak institutions suggest that consolidation may be ongoing, Korea nevertheless demonstrates a strong example of a peaceful democratic transition.

III. AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Africa's development experience mirrors that of Korea's early years. Korea was a forerunner of both Africa's wave of decolonization in the early 1960s and its wave of democratization in the early 1990s. In the intervening years, Korea's early democratic hopes were taken over by authoritarian regimes in a pattern also seen throughout Africa. Like Korea, several African countries became the front line of confrontation between the two super powers of the Cold War.

Africa's Path towards Development

When Korea gained its independence from Japan in 1945, the only two independent African countries, Liberia and Ethiopia, were also the only two that had not been colonized by European powers. The so-called Scramble for Africa had culminated in the 1884 Conference of Berlin, where the colonial powers divided the continent and drew the borders of its present-day states with little regard for existing political or ethnic boundaries. It was not until the aftermath of World War II, beginning around 1960, that the majority of African colonies gained their independence from European powers.

Virtually all of these former colonies began independence with competitive elections and the intention to become fully democratic and to promote equality through economic growth. By the late 1960s however, most had slipped into authoritarianism. The Cold War divided the former colonies into two camps aligned with patrons that too often valued security and loyalty over reform and civil rights. Civil conflicts in Angola and elsewhere became proxy wars that inflicted massive casualties and destroyed infrastructure. Covert operations in countries like the Belgian Congo eliminated popular or democratically elected leaders and supported authoritarian dictatorships. By the time Korea began its transition to democracy in 1987, only three of the forty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and none of the North African countries, could be called democracies.

Upon close examination of economic growth and governance, the histories of Africa and Korea diverge even more. While Korea's steady economic growth has made it one of the largest economies in the world, most African countries are characterized by extreme poverty, rural populations, and underdeveloped economies. According to the UNDP's *Human Development Report 2010*, many African countries experienced little to no growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Some countries, including Zambia and Zimbabwe, actually rank lower on the UNDP's Human Development Index now than they did in 1970. In recent decades, this has been compounded by the failure of structural adjustment programs to spur economic growth as well as unforeseen crises brought on by global climate

change and the rapid spread of HIV. The World Health Organization estimates that the negative impact of HIV and AIDS on productivity and human capital in high-burden countries is responsible for a decrease of 1.7 to 2.7 percent growth per year.

Despite these challenges, the economic future of the African continent is looking brighter. In the last decade, African countries experienced some of the highest growth rates in the world, averaging 5.8 percent per year between 2000 and 2008. These growth figures actually put Africa ahead of East Asia for eight of the past ten years. The International Monetary Fund expects this trend to continue, estimating that growth in 2011 was 6 percent and projecting that growth for 2012 will be 6 percent.

Comparison of Korean and African Development Experiences

What accounts for the very different outcomes in Korea and Africa? Every country and every development process is uniquely influenced by factors specific to its location, history, and time. While some aspects of Korea's experience were specific to its circumstances, can and should certain aspects be shared with African countries?

Some of Africa's challenges cannot be solved by economic policies alone. Climate change, creeping desertification, and racial and religious segmentation all fall into this category. The burden of HIV and AIDS, as already mentioned, also has a significant effect on afflicted countries' demographics and human capacity. Other constraints include the colonial legacy, Cold War alignments, and destructive civil wars. In the early stages of its development, Korea also faced many of these constraints, but it either overcame them or used them to its advantage. For this reason, Korea can serve as not only a roadmap but an example that such a path is possible.

Despite these similarities, Korea had two advantages that only a few African countries share. The first was relative equality. The destruction of the Korean War removed both the power of the historical social classes and the country's hierarchical social structure. The GINI coefficient rates countries' income disparity, with zero being completely equal and one being completely unequal. According to calculations made by Kookshin Ahn in 1992, Korea's GINI coefficient was 0.34 in 1965, placing it well below the global average of 0.47 for that year. Korea's current GINI coefficient of 0.31 places the country in the in the seventy-ninth percentile of global income equality, only slightly less equal than its 1993 rating of 0.29. Combined with a population that was both racially and linguistically homogenous, this decreased internal strife enabled Korea to pull together under firm leadership to work toward a common goal in the first decades after the Korean War.

By comparison, African countries tend to be highly unequal and more internally fractured. Africa's mean GINI coefficient today is 0.58, above the global average of 0.52. The top six unequal countries worldwide are all in Africa, and only one African country has a lower coefficient than Korea. This indicates that, in African countries, elites have been able to effectively manipulate policies and capture rents. It also indicates a lack of societal cohesiveness that would induce leaders to reinvest in human and physical capital that would enable the country to develop as a whole. Similarly, because European powers arbitrarily determined the boundaries of African states during the 1884 Conference of Berlin, most African countries are not homogenous and often include several ethnic and linguistic groups with contentious histories. Colonial powers often made these tensions worse by playing them off against each other as a way to maintain control.

Korea's second advantage was its high investment in human capital and its history of valuing education. The priority placed on primary and vocational education created a skilled and flexible workforce, making it possible for Korea to both increase its productivity and take advantage of new opportunities as they arose. During reconstruction following the end of the Korean War, 10 percent of the government budget was dedicated to education. According to Korean Educational Statistical Yearbooks, the share of total government expenditures dedicated to the Ministry of Education had increased to 19 percent by 1967. From that year until the end of the Park Chung-hee regime in 1979, the ministry's budget averaged 17.4 percent of government spending and never dropped below 15 percent.

It was not simply the amount of resources dedicated to education that laid Korea's foundation for rapid economic development but also how these funds were allocated. As Kim Chong-sup and Hong Min-kyung show in "Education Policy and Industrial Development" in 2010, Korea's investment in education at any given time was not significantly higher than other developing countries in absolute terms. What made the difference was the government's ability to identify specific educational needs during each stage of development and to modify the allocation of educational spending as those needs changed. During Korea's reconstruction in the 1950s, the country's first priority was to achieve universal primary education. Primary education received 70 percent of education funding, and by 1965 Korea had achieved 100 percent primary school enrollment. The focus then shifted to secondary education, and the budget for secondary education steadily increased while primary education spending decreased gradually to a level that could maintain universal enrollment. Universal secondary school enrollment was achieved in the 1980s. A steady increase in funding for tertiary education followed. In 1970, tertiary enrollment was less than 10 percent, but by 1990 this had increased to 40 percent. The World Bank reports that tertiary enrollment in Korea exceeds 90 percent today. This targeted

investment in education allowed Korea to build and maintain a solid education structure and an educated workforce. Today, Korea's ration of education spending to GDP is one of the highest in the OECD.

Korea also made a simultaneous push to increase technical education. Beginning in the 1960s, President Park identified lack of skilled labor as a limitation on industrialization, and he used his five-year plans to develop a system for vocational training. This training focused on the needs of key industries, beginning with manufacturing and later moving into chemicals and new technologies. This investment was crucial to Korea's success in "catching up" to the developed economies of the United States and Japan, because it provided the skilled labor necessary for the targeted industries to become globally competitive. As Guilo Guarini and colleagues find in their 2006 analysis of Korean labor productivity, this investment allowed Korea to increase its labor productivity from 22 percent of US productivity in 1975 to 54 percent in 1999.

As previously mentioned, official direct assistance made up a significant portion of Korea's budget during the decades of initial education investment in the 1950s and 1960s, both directly through budgetary assistance and indirectly through taxes and revenue from foreign-aid imports and capital formation. This assistance allowed the government to dedicate resources to sectors that might not otherwise have been priorities in a budget constrained to providing only basic services. While inequality and ethnic tensions are only overcome through long-term efforts to forge national unity and through managed growth to distribute wealth more evenly, focusing on education is something that African nations can and should pursue more vigorously. This provides an opening for ODA and is an area in which Korea can share its experience and provide a model for development.

International Development Efforts in Africa and an Opening for a Third Way

For most of the history of development assistance, donor countries have been either European or North American. Particularly in Africa, former colonial powers Britain and France remained highly involved even after their departure; and during the Cold War the United States saw Africa as contested ground to be won from the Soviet Union. Development assistance was a way to further foreign-policy goals of donor countries, strengthening political alliances and ensuring access to natural resources; foreign aid was less concerned with the consequences of supporting unpopular leaders and overlooking human-rights violations.

By the 1970s, most African countries had abandoned their initial experiments with democracy and had become authoritarian regimes. Years of economic

mismanagement led to financial crises that brought governments close to bankruptcy and prevented them from paying for their bloated public sectors. International financial institutions stepped in to offer loans but tied them to unpopular structural adjustment programs. This forced austerity on already weak economies, resulting in rapid devaluation of currency, rising prices, and large-scale layoffs. This in turn contributed to social unrest and a growing distrust of the Western aid community. By the 1990s, this approach was understood to have been ineffective and at least partially responsible for the lost decades of economic growth that many countries endured. Development-aid focus then turned to promoting democracy and good governance, with the belief that democratization would bring economic growth and independence. While the individual stories of African countries vary, decades of aid have not been effective enough to produce the sustained growth necessary to lift Africa out of poverty. Deep distrust rooted in the colonial legacy and fostered through more recent disappointments has made it difficult for new solutions proposed by the West to gain credibility among the general population.

As China has grown in global importance, it has taken a more active role in Africa and challenged the dominance of Western development efforts. In the last decade, China has become the most important trading partner of many African countries, including the continent's largest economy, South Africa. Trade with China accounted for 38.5 percent of African trade with emerging markets in 2011 and totaled over $120 billion. It is more difficult to quantify China's official direct assistance, however, because of lack of transparency. The International Monetary Fund estimates that China's development assistance to Africa was $2.3 billion in 2006. Of this, $1 billion was ODA and the remaining $1.3 billion was debt relief. An additional $0.9 billion was given in foreign direct investment (FDI).

Chinese development assistance does not follow traditional development models. There is not a centralized development agency attached to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and charged with oversight and coordination of aid projects, as is standard in OECD countries. Instead, assistance is primarily distributed in the form of loans and grants through the Ministry of Commerce. This is because the primary purpose of Chinese development assistance is to further China's economic priorities and to gain access to natural resources. China favors highly visible infrastructure projects, such as highways and stadiums, which are often given in exchange for construction or extraction contracts or as necessary improvements in order to transport natural resources. At least half of the human and capital investment must be sourced from China as well, ensuring that revenue will feed back into its economy.

The Chinese development model has been criticized for being highly exploitive and unsupportive of sustainable growth. Chinese aid places no preconditions

on domestic policy; the imperative for smooth commercial relations means that China prefers to work with governments that will make the process as simple as possible. This approach favors weak government regulation and strong centralized control over decision making, characteristics that do not necessarily align with liberal democratic values. Use of Chinese labor and capital also means that partner countries do not benefit from increases in employment and revenue.

In some ways, Korea shares China's motivations in Africa. Like China, Korea is seeking a new role for itself on the international stage. Also like China, Korea faces pressing energy-security issues and must find new resources to fuel continued growth and meet the increasing demands of a growing middle class. Korea's involvement in Africa is fundamentally different from its neighbor's, however, as economic motivations are noticeably absent from initiatives to date. While China has been explicit about its intention to pursue strategic partnerships to further its own economic interests, Korea has chosen instead to focus on the needs and priorities of its partner countries, strengthening their institutions and building their capacities. In turn, Korea hopes to earn credibility in the international development community and gain a higher-profile role in international development forums.

Park Soo-deok, director of the African Division of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, addresses this topic in his 2011 paper "Ways to Share Korea's Development Experience with Africa." He argues that both Western countries and China have shortcomings that limit their effectiveness in African development. The West has lost Africa's trust because of its long and complicated history dating back to colonization. It is a relationship that will forever be charged with historical tensions and insecurities. China offers an attractive alternative in that it is willing to give money without preconditions. Park argues that this approach is not sustainable because it hampers long term social and political change by reinforcing the status quo—helping to keep incumbents in power.

Africa is in need of a new approach and Korea offers an alternative. With its own recent experience, Korea understands the pitfalls of development and the challenges facing African countries. It has struggled with the legacies of colonization, war, authoritarianism, and poverty. More importantly, it was able to overcome these challenges to emerge as a liberal democracy and an influential actor on the world stage. Because of this, it has the legitimacy that both Western countries and China lack. It is this that Park Soo-deok emphasizes when he says that Africans and Koreans share "a bond of historical and emotional sympathy." He continues, "Africans are eager to learn about our development experience. This is Korea's unique strength upon which we can build mutual trust."

IV. KOREA IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Korea's Path from Recipient to Donor

Korea's role in international development has roots dating back several decades. Korea's rapid growth caught the attention of other developing countries early on, leading to an increasing demand to share its experience and advice. While still an aid recipient, Korea began to provide technical training to the governments of other developing countries through a program sponsored by USAID. Later in the 1970s, Korea began to provide modest amounts of in-kind aid through South-South partnerships to many African countries. In 1987, Korea established the Economic Development Cooperation Fund in order to offer grants and loans to the governments of developing countries around the world.

It was not until the 1990s, however, that Korea became a serious player in the international development community. In 1991, it consolidated its development efforts into the Korean International Cooperation Agency under the slogan "Creating a Better World Together." As this implies, Korea's development assistance has focused on equal partnerships and meaningful sustainable relationships with the governments of other countries. This differs from the traditional donor-beneficiary relationships that divide the world into two classes of countries. In 1996, Korea joined the OECD and, in 1999, became a founding member of the new G-20 summit made up of finance ministers and central bank governors of the world's nineteen largest economies plus the European Union. In 2009, Korea became a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, a first for a former aid-receiving country and Korea's symbolic arrival as a developed country.

When Korea hosted the second G-20 summit in November 2010, it promoted a new model for development called the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth (Seoul Consensus). In one of the summit's few successes, all member countries agreed to replace the discredited Washington Consensus that had led development thinking until the 1990s. This was a definitive shift away from structural adjustment programs led by international financial institutions and also an official acknowledgement of the development successes of emerging markets, including Korea. While the Seoul Consensus outlined six principles of development and nine target areas as part of a multiyear action plan, it also stressed that one development method would not fit all countries. It emphasized treating lower-income countries as full partners and giving their governments the flexibility to pursue policies they identify to be in their best interests. This important statement signaled a shifting world order in which emerging economies are increasingly able to exert their influence on behalf of developing countries.

One year after the Seoul Consensus, in November and December 2011, Korea built on this momentum as host of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The choice of Busan as host city for the summit was symbolic. Busan had been one of the only cities to remain under South Korean control throughout the Korean War and it temporarily housed the government. Because of this, it became one of the main ports by which foreign aid entered the country. It later developed into a center of commerce and industry, and today it is the world's fifth-busiest seaport. Korea used this summit to highlight the effectiveness of aid in its own development history and to promote horizontal cooperation, integration of aid efforts between multilateral organizations and private donors, and the importance of developing domestic capacity.

Korea's Development Partnership with Africa

In parallel with Korea's increasing participation in international forums, Korea put its development approach into practice through cooperative partnerships with African countries. In preparation for the first Korean-African Forum in 2006, Korean president Roh Moo-hyun visited Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt. It was the first time in over two decades that a Korean president had visited the continent in an official capacity, and he was warmly received. During the trip, President Roh announced his Initiative for African Development and committed Korea to triple its official direct assistance to Africa to $100 million by 2008. Although this amount seemed small compared to the $10 billion China planned to give over those three years, Korea's unique approach gave it legitimacy and respect uncommon in such relationships.

The first Korean-African Forum, which took place in 2006, was an initiative of then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon. Presidents from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Benin participated, along with ministers from twenty-five other African states. The goals of the forum were to establish Korea as an official partner in African development and to present an alternative development approach. Three important decisions were made: Korea pledged to increase its number of diplomatic missions in Africa (then eighteen), to build a professional training institute for African studies in Korea to bring together Korean and African experts to develop effective policy recommendations, and to develop partnerships with the private sector to promote initiatives in Africa. Annual Korean-African Forums have since become central to Korea's development policy and have been held in Seoul each fall since 2009.

Korea's collaborative approach to development is illustrated in its partnership with Rwanda. Since 1997, Korean volunteers had gone to Rwanda to give trainings and do individual projects. In 2008, the Korean International Cooperation Agency

strengthened the relationship by placing five Korean strategic-planning experts in President Paul Kagame's Strategic Policy Unit for one year. The Koreans worked with representatives from government ministries to identify Rwanda's primary development needs and to find ways that Korea could offer assistance. At the end of the year, the Korean-Rwandan team of experts presented President Kagame with suggestions for increasing Rwanda's growth in key sectors where the country could be most competitive and Korea's experience best applied. KOICA, in coordination with the Rwandan government, chose to initially focus investment on technical training for skilled workers in the textile and pharmaceutical sectors as well as on offering wider educational opportunities for Rwandan students domestically and abroad in Korean universities.

Korea's focus on education makes sense given its experience and expertise. Education is Korea's largest sector of foreign aid, comprising just over 30 percent of its assistance. Of this, 30 percent goes to primary education, 49 percent to secondary and vocational education, 10 percent to higher education, and 11 percent to other educational projects. KOICA's three-part strategy for education assistance is based on Korea's own educational system. First, the strategy begins by helping countries develop educational infrastructure by building and renovating primary and secondary schools, universities, and vocational training centers. The second step is to improve the quality and relevance of education, which is accomplished by developing new curriculums and teaching materials and by training educators. The third step is to improve education management, done primarily in collaboration with governments by reviewing and revising education policy and instituting national standards.

In Tanzania, KOICA's aid has incorporated all three steps of this strategy. In line with the country's desire to become competitive in the communication technology sector, KOICA renovated some University of Dar es Salaam buildings to create state-of-the-art engineering facilities that would allow the College of Engineering to double its yearly graduates. To facilitate innovative instruction and increase education capacity, KOICA sent a team of Korean lecturers to share their professional and academic expertise with Tanzanian professors and students. KOICA also sent managers to assist in setting up an engineering faculty intended to be the best of its kind on the continent. This faculty would inform national education policy and set new standards.

Korea's expanding development cooperation with Africa is still very new and limited to small-scale projects, so no long-term studies have yet analyzed its effectiveness in comparison to other models of delivering aid. Qualitative evidence suggests, however, that these initiatives have been positively received and have become a foundation for lasting development partnerships. President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania expressed his gratitude that Korea's assistance in

developing much-needed vocational training programs had come at the right time, and President Kagame has spoken of his desire to emulate Korea's dedication to his own country's development. The Democratic Republic of Congo's president, Joseph Kabila, expressed these sentiments best during his 2010 trip to Korea: "It is a huge challenge for the Democratic Congo to win this war [against poverty and underdevelopment] and in order to meet this enormous challenge we are looking for reliable and respectable partners...Korea can be such a partner."

V. CONCLUSION

Korea's experiences as both a recipient and a donor of development aid give it a unique ability to bridge the gap between the two communities. As formerly one of the poorest countries in the world and an aid recipient, Korea can empathize with the pressures and challenges faced by countries in Africa. President Kabila emphasized this in a March 2010 meeting with Korea's director of the African Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade:

> Just like many African countries, Korea went through colonial rule, civil war, famine and poverty. Under even worse conditions than many African countries, Korea achieved industrialization and economic growth in a short period of time, realized democratization on top of that, and became a G20 member envisioning a "Global Korea."

Korea does not have the same economic resources to devote to development assistance as China and other Western-led development agencies. Its power will instead come through knowledge and partnerships. As the only country in the world to overcome these challenges and become an open liberal democracy, Korea has the credibility to change the practice and discourse of development.

In Africa, Korea's development model provides an alternative to both traditional Western-led assistance and extractive Chinese aid. Korea's own experiences give weight to the belief that effective development policies must be based on the circumstances and strengths of an individual country. The relationship between donor and recipient must be one of mutual cooperation and respect, in which policy recommendations are neither made at the expense of local citizens nor intentionally undermine necessary institutions. This spirit of cooperation fosters open communication not only between the governments but also between the citizens of partner countries. In this way, Korean development initiatives are able to positively support political and social reform efforts while working to strengthen long-term economic growth.

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