North Korea conducted its fifth and most powerful nuclear test in September 2016. It is also making significant progress on its delivery systems, rapidly expanding its stockpile of fissile materials, and steadily improving on its nuclear weapon designs. There is ... growing concern that if this process continues, North Korea could soon become a clear and present danger not only to Northeast Asia, but also to the United States. With this in mind, the US-Korea Institute at SAIS partnered with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University to convene some of the leading experts on Northeast Asia security issues to take stock of the issue and consider what steps can be taken to stabilize the situation and halt North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction. The two-day conference was held at Stanford University in mid-June and was co-chaired by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. The following report is a summary of the main points discussed by the participants, with the primary takeaway that there is a need for a comprehensive policy review along the lines of the “Perry Process” fifteen years ago. View »

Pyongyang’s inventory of delivery systems is a key factor in considering North Korea’s nuclear future. While its current inventory is well developed, although limited to old Soviet technology only able to reach regional targets, North Korea has bigger ambitions and ... is seriously pursuing the deployment of more capable, longer-range, more survivable weapons. However, the future of its nuclear delivery systems remains uncertain given technical, engineering and other challenges the North will have to face. This report details North Korea’s current missile program and provides low-end, medium and high-end scenarios for its future delivery systems capabilities. In developing these projections, a number of potential constraints are considered, including engineering and technical challenges, access to foreign assistance and the regime’s political and economic commitment to the modernization of its arsenal. View »

Any future negotiations with North Korea will need to consider the role of economic incentives and rewards for making progress in meeting US goals of reducing Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons capabilities and risk of proliferation. This will require shaping a nuanced ... balance between the role of measures to maintain pressure to negotiate versus incentives and rewards that are meaningful to the North Koreans and have traction in the negotiations process. Changes in North Korea’s economic circumstances, external relations environment and domestic political context in recent years need to be taken into account when designing a strategy that relates to current North Korean leadership interests and challenges. Doing so will increase the chances of new negotiations being more successful in meeting US goals than previous efforts. This paper explores considerations for selecting positive inducements that will support a negotiation strategy that leads to a sustainable political solution to North Korea’s nuclear threats and that will position North Korea to pursue its economic future in ways that are compatible with reduced isolation and increased integration with the international community.  View »

North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear program is placing greater demands on US extended deterrence and also raising questions in Seoul and Tokyo about the robustness of US commitments. These challenges are likely to grow over the coming years, as North Korea ... appears poised to expand the quantity, quality and diversity of weapons systems in its arsenal in potentially dramatic ways. Keeping up with the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance is likely to test US policymakers and military planners for the foreseeable future. Failure to manage related challenges could have far-reaching strategic consequences. This paper explores the geostrategic implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea—specifically, the challenges for extended deterrence and alliance relations—and the impact of alternative North Korean nuclear “futures.” First, it reflects on a more general debate about whether nuclear weapons reinforce deterrence relationships or embolden aggressive behavior, and what we might expect from North Korea as its nuclear capabilities grow. While it is impossible to know whether and how Pyongyang’s foreign policy would change, there are legitimate reasons for concern. The paper then discusses extended deterrence and assurance challenges in East Asia. It concludes with a discussion about the impact of different North Korean nuclear developments on those challenges over the coming years. View »

The Tumen Triangle region-where North Korea, China and Russia meet-is, in many ways, the story of regional integration being held back by the political concerns of Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow. There are long-term forces at work here, such as Moscow’s ... concerns over Chinese dominance in the sparsely populated Russian Far East. This legacy of mistrust frames cross-border interactions and despite recent warm relations, major cross-border cooperation remains limited. In this USKI Special Report, Andray Abrahamian, Director of Research at Choson Exchange examines historical legacies, contemporary relations and shifting strategic priorities between the three countries. The report then focuses trade and investment in the Tumen Triangle region, particularly how the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Primorsky Krai interact with and affect Rason Special City, the center of the Rason Special Economic Zone View »

The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the ... precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. This paper will identify a number of arenas where North Korea’s becoming a nuclear weapons possessor state might be expected to have significant negative consequences, and it will assess the damage likely to be done. As will be seen, the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear. View »